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COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
INSIGHTS FROM COMPARATIVE POLITICS
AND COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
Christopher A. Whytock
I. INTRODUCTION
Interesting and important causal questions permeate the field of
comparative constitutional law. These questions are sometimes
about the factors that shape constitutions and constitutional
processes.
What accounts for cross-national differences in
constitutions?
Under what circumstances is constitutional
“borrowing” likely to occur, either in the form of references by
domestic constitutional court judges to foreign legal principles in
constitutional interpretation, or adoption by one country’s
constitutional reformers of another country’s constitutional
arrangements?1 Why are some constitutions lasting, while others
fail? Sometimes these questions are about the economic, political, or
social consequences of constitutions. Constitutions may be intended
to create checks and balances between different branches of
government, to guarantee citizens certain rights, or to foster
economic development—but do they have the intended effects?
What unintended consequences might result when a constitution
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thanks participants at those meetings, especially Carles Boix, Walter Carnota, Herbert Kitschelt,
Daniel Kselman, Kevin Morrison, Joel Simmons, Matthew Singer, and Günter Walzenbach.
1. Emphasizing the importance of such questions, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight argue that
“decisions over whether to borrow or not, and from where . . . are decisions about institutional
design.” Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L. J.
CONST. L. 196, 200 (2003).
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interacts with a country’s other institutional features, and with its
culture? What, in other words, are the real-world implications of
different constitutional arrangements?2 Furthermore, causal claims
are intrinsic to the entire endeavor of constitutional design:
prescribing a particular constitutional solution to a social problem
implies a statement about the solution’s likely consequences.3
Yet comparative constitutional law scholarship so far has shed
little light on the answers to these questions and the validity of these
claims. As Ran Hirschl notes, “Most leading works in the field
continue to lag behind the social sciences in their ability to trace
causal links among pertinent variables, let alone to substantiate or
refute testable hypotheses.”4 Similarly, Robert Cooter argues that
with constitutional scholarship’s focus “on the constitution as an
historical agreement and a repository of values,” it does not pay
sufficient attention to “the constitution as an incentive structure that
affects behavior.”5 To the extent comparative law scholars have
engaged in theorizing about cause-and-effect relationships, as they
have done in the field of comparative law and economics, the
emphasis has been on private law rather than public law.6 Insofar as
positive theoretical efforts have been made to understand the
consequences of constitutions, they generally have been

2. As Martha Nussbaum notes, outcomes are a pervasive concern of comparative
constitutional law: “Whether or not constitutional provisions and their interpretation have a
prepolitical moral basis, they have consequences. . . . Do they produce stability or instability?
Do they deliver the welfare that they seek to deliver?” Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction to
Comparative Constitutionalism, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 429, 433 (2002).
3. Jon Elster has argued that constitutional design is better driven by considerations of
justice rather than consequences. Jon Elster, Arguments for Constitutional Choice: Reflections on
the Transition to Socialism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 303 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988). However, to the extent justice is concerned with the real-world human
implications of constitutions, or to the extent consequentialist arguments are rooted in notions
about what kinds of outcomes are just, the distinction between consequences and justice in
constitutional design would seem somewhat difficult to maintain. See, e.g., GIOVANNI SARTORI,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING 198 (2d ed. 1997) (“If the consequences of
institutional structures are impossible to predict, then the same darkness—and I would say an
even greater one—applies to reforms dictated by justice.”).
4. Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM.
J. COMP. L. 125, 125 (2005).
5. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 360 (2000).
6. UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS, at x (1997) (“[W]hile law and
economics has made valuable contributions to the understanding of private law, its contribution to
public law is less impressive and in that area much work still has to be done.”).
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unaccompanied by empirical hypothesis testing.7 And although there
is relevant empirical scholarship, it is often aimed at description and
conceptual refinement rather than explanation.8 These are important
tasks to be sure,9 but they cannot by themselves respond to the
fundamental causal questions and claims that flow through
comparative constitutional law.
In this article, I argue that legal scholars have much to gain from
taking causality seriously in comparative constitutional law, and I
suggest that scholarship on comparative politics and comparative
political economy provides useful insights about how this might be
done.10 I develop my argument in four parts. First, I provide a brief
overview of recent comparative constitutional law scholarship to
highlight the pervasive issues of causality that it raises. These issues
take two basic forms, one having to do with the origins of cross7. Cooter suggests that “[h]ypothesis testing in constitutional law awaits improved
government statistics and a new generation of constitutional scholars with mastery over empirical
methods.” COOTER, supra note 5, at 374. As I show below, there actually is a significant amount
of existing work in comparative politics and comparative political economy that uses empirical
analysis to systematically test hypotheses about the consequences of constitutions. See infra Part
III; see also Hirschl, supra note 4 (reviewing comparative constitutional law research by
comparative politics scholars that use qualitative methods to evaluate hypotheses about causality
in comparative constitutional law).
8. Epstein & Knight, supra note 1, at 196–97; Hirschl, supra note 4, at 126.
9. Causal inference relies on description, and, as social science methodologist John Gerring
emphasizes, “[c]oncept formation concerns the most basic question of social science research:
What are we talking about?” JOHN GERRING, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY: A CRITERIAL
FRAMEWORK 35 (2001).
10. By making this argument, I certainly do not intend to suggest that causal claims and
questions are all that should concern comparative constitutional law scholars, and although I think
they are of fundamental importance, I would hesitate to argue that they are necessarily the most
important issues facing comparative constitutional law scholars. Moreover, by focusing on
comparative politics and comparative political economy as sources of insights about causality in
comparative constitutional law, I do not mean to downplay the importance of the contributions
that other disciplines from outside the legal academy can make to comparative constitutional law
scholarship. Finally, it is important to note at the outset that some scholars are skeptical about the
very possibility of answering causal questions about constitutions with a useful degree of
certainty. See, e.g., Elster, supra note 3, at 304 (arguing that since “it is impossible to predict
with certainty or even quantified probability the consequences of a major constitutional change,”
constitutional reform should not be based on consequentialist grounds). But see SARTORI, supra
note 3, at 198 (disagreeing with Elster’s argument, and with the “behaviourist absurdity” that
“constitutions do not matter”). For a particularly optimistic view, see Peter C. Ordeshook, Are
“Western” Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other than the Countries They Serve?, 13 CONST.
POL. ECON. 3 (2002) (arguing based on rational choice theory that there are universally applicable
principles of constitutional design). Although I agree that causal claims should be met with
skepticism—indeed, this is part of my argument that comparative constitutional law scholars
should take causality seriously—I generally am less pessimistic than Elster about the possibility
of improving our understanding about the real-world impact of different constitutional
arrangements, and less optimistic than Ordeshook.
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national constitutional variation, the other with the economic,
political and social consequences of this variation. However,
comparative constitutional law scholars so far have done little to
address these questions in an empirically rigorous manner.
Second, I introduce examples of the work that political scientists
and economists have done on comparative constitutional law. They
ask questions about the origins and consequences of constitutions
that are similar to those raised by comparative constitutional law
scholars. But they frame these questions in explicitly causal terms,
developing positive theories about cause-and-effect relationships
from which hypotheses can be derived, and testing them empirically
using social science methods of causal inference.11 Moreover,
scholars of comparative politics and comparative political economy
have provided strong empirical evidence that constitutions indeed
have consequences for important outcomes, ranging from political
stability and ethnic conflict, to fiscal deficits and public spending.
This interdisciplinary perspective thus reinforces the real-world
importance of comparative constitutional law as a field of study, and
suggests that empirical comparative constitutional law represents a
wide open frontier in comparative legal scholarship.
Third, I illustrate one way that social science methods of causal
inference might be used to address causal claims and causal
questions in comparative constitutional law. Substantively, the
illustration is drawn from the field of comparative political economy
and focuses on the economic consequences of constitutions. More
precisely, it investigates the effects that different constitutional
arrangements of executive-legislative relations have on levels of
government spending. Methodologically, the illustration is a basic
example of “large-N” statistical analysis—namely ordinary least
squares regression analysis of cross-national data on constitutions,
government spending, and various other institutional, demographic
and economic factors in 80 democracies. I also show how
multiplicative interaction terms can be used to model and empirically
test for conditional relationships between constitutions and various
political, social, or economic outcomes. By arguing that these
methods can be important tools for comparative constitutional law
11. For a much more in-depth review of qualitative comparative politics research on
constitutions aimed at making sound causal inferences, see Hirschl, supra note 4.
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scholars, I do not mean to suggest that they are the only way to take
causality seriously. As Hirschl richly illustrates, qualitative or
“small-N” analysis is also important in comparative constitutional
analysis and, as emphasized below, often better suited than statistical
analysis for exploring causal processes.
I conclude by outlining an agenda for empirical comparative
constitutional law. Theoretically, the focus would be on research
questions that are framed in explicitly causal terms, and on the
development of positive theories from which hypothetical answers
could be derived. Methodologically, the goal would be to select
appropriate techniques for empirically evaluating these hypotheses
while maintaining awareness about the methodological tradeoffs that
these choices entail. Pedagogically, the challenge is to figure out
how, and how much, to incorporate considerations about the origins
and consequences of constitutional arrangements into comparative
law and constitutional law teaching.
Cooter argues that “constitutions can cause suffering on a vast
scale or lay the foundation for a nation’s liberty and prosperity.”12
Of course, human welfare also depends on many other factors, some
of which surely are even more important than constitutions.
Nevertheless, as Cooter’s comment suggests, the real-world
consequences of constitutions are too important to ignore.
II. CAUSAL QUESTIONS AND CAUSAL CLAIMS IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The comparative study of constitutions can be traced at least as
far back as Aristotle’s analysis of the constitutions of Greek citystates in The Politics.13 Significant portions of The Federalist Papers
focus on comparative constitutional analysis.14 John W. Burgess, the
founder of Columbia University’s political science department and
one of the founders of modern political science, considered
comparative constitutional law to be one of that discipline’s
cornerstones.15
12. COOTER, supra note 5, at 2.
13. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (William Ellis trans., Prometheus Books 1986) (n.d.).
14. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 18–20 (James Madison), NOS. 21-23 (Alexander
Hamilton) (drawing lessons from the constitutional experiences of Germany, the Netherlands, and
ancient Greece).
15. JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Boston, Ginn & Co. 1893). Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner provide an explanation for political
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Yet comparative constitutional law failed to find a secure and
prominent place in either law or political science. In the legal
academy, the study of American constitutional law flourished while
comparative legal scholarship focused predominantly on private
law.16 Some leading comparativists simply were not convinced that
their methods were suited for the study of public law.17 In political
science, the “behavioral revolution” temporarily marginalized the
study of law and institutions altogether.18
But real-world events reinvigorated comparative constitutional
law scholarship in both disciplines. As legal scholars Vicki Jackson
science’s early preoccupation with constitutions. According to them, early American political
science was inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s late 19th-century work on public administration that
emphasized both the centrality of the state and the need to subject it to constitutional restraints.
Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner, American Political Science: The Discipline’s State and the
State of the Discipline, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 1, 9–10 (Ira
Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2001). “Characterized by a focus on formal institutions,
public administration and law, the core of the country’s new political science was infused with an
emphasis on the elements of political liberalism articulated by Wilson.” Id. Thus, among the
central concerns of the young discipline was to understand “the features that distinguish liberal
democratic regimes from other forms of public authority, whether dictatorial, oligarchic or, later,
totalitarian . . . and, most prominent of all, the rules governing relations between the state and its
citizens in civil society.” Id.
16. Donald P. Kommers, Comparative Constitutional Law: Its Increasing Relevance, in
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61, 62 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2002).
17. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, for example, argued that their functionalist method of
comparison was most appropriate for relatively “unpolitical” areas of private law. KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 40 (3d ed. 1998). Meanwhile,
other comparativists began to question the private law/public law distinction altogether. See, e.g.,
Martin Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public Law,” 5 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 410 (1972) (arguing against the public law-private law distinction on the grounds that
both areas of law authoritatively allocate values).
18. Reflecting the influence of the behavioral approach, the opening editorial statement in
the first issue of the political science journal, Comparative Politics, begins by expressing
“skepticism about the value of institutional and legal analysis,” and calling for greater emphasis
on “social and cultural factors” and “the application of the scientific method and, hence, with the
verification of hypotheses through comparative analysis.” Bernard E. Brown et al., A Statement
by the Editors, 1 COMP. POL. 1, 1 (1968). Comparative government had become comparative
politics, and the triumph of the behavioralist revolution in the field was announced. See Ira
Katznelson, Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS:
RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE 81 (Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman eds.,
1997). As Robert Dahl explains, the behavioral movement was a “protest movement within
political science” against the traditional emphasis on institutions and in favor of increased study
of individual political behavior. Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science:
Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763, 766 (1961). As a
result, “[a]lthough the concept of institution never disappeared from theoretical political science,
it [was] largely supplanted in recent years by a conception of political life that is
noninstitutional.” JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 2–3 (1989).
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and Mark Tushnet explain, “The present generation’s interest in
comparative constitutional law has been fueled . . . by the confluence
of the great wave of constitutional reform that flowed around the
world—from Central and Eastern Europe to South Africa and Latin
America—in the 1980s and 1990s, with the development of a strong
community associated with international rights.”19
Similarly,
according to political scientists Matthew Soberg Shugart and John
M. Carey, “Recent advances of democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe and other parts of the globe have given impetus to the study
of designing constitutions and the consequences of institutional
The “new institutionalism” that developed in the
choice.”20
aftermath of the behavioral revolution provided a conceptual and
theoretical basis for the analysis of constitutions in the comparative
politics subfield of political science.21
Three closely related approaches dominate contemporary legal
scholarship on comparative constitutions.22 The first approach
describes the various ways that different countries’ constitutions
address similar problems, and then analyzes these differences with
the goal of “self-reflection through analogy, distinction, and
contrast,” or in order to refine constitutional concepts.23 This is, for
19. Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xi, xiii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002)
(noting the importance of the development of a strong international human rights community for
the resurgence of comparative constitutional study).
20. MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 1 (1992).
21. In 1984, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen declared that “a new institutionalism has
appeared in political science.” James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism:
Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 734 (1984). Just as the
behavioralist movement was a reaction to the formalism that preceded it, the new institutionalism
was itself a reaction to the behavioralism of the 1960s and 1970s. See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary
C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996).
As public law political scientist Rogers M. Smith explains, “The road March and Olsen stress is a
path of reaction against the treatment of legal and political institutions simply as epiphenomena of
self-interested individual and group behavior—a treatment dominant in mainstream U.S. political
science since the 1950s . . . .” Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the “New
Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 91 (1988). For an
overview of the “new institutionalist” literature in political science, see Hall & Taylor, supra.
22. For a more methodologically oriented classification of comparative constitutional law
scholarship, see Hirschl, supra note 4, at 126–32.
23. Hirschl, supra note 4, at 126. This combines Hirschl’s second and third categories of
comparative constitutional law scholarship. As Mary Ann Glendon argues, “Since controlled
experimentation in law is hardly ever possible, legal scholars often use comparative law, just as
they sometimes consult history, to see how legal systems of the past or present have dealt with
problems similar to ours. The hope is that history and comparison will give us insight into our
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example, the standard approach in the growing number of
comparative constitutional law casebooks,24 which typically organize
material according to a variety of important political or societal
problems—such as constitutional review, the separation of powers,
federalism, and individual rights—and invite analysis of different
constitutional responses to these problems.25 In effect, this involves
the application of comparative private law’s traditionally dominant
methodology, functionalism,26 to comparative public law.27
According to Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz’s classic statement of
the functionalist method, “the legal system of every society faces
essentially the same problems, and solves these problems by quite
different means though very often with similar results.”28 Thus, the
functionalist method begins by identifying common problems and
only then turns to the analysis of different legal arrangements. The
functionalist method has been vigorously criticized;29 but by
own situation . . . .” MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 1, 1
(1987).
24. See, e.g., NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (3d ed. 2003);
VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999);. DONALD
P. KOMMERS ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS, CASES, AND COMPARATIVE
NOTES (2d ed. 2004).
25. Hirschl, supra note 4, at 129. For example, both JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 24,
and DORSEN ET AL., supra note 24, include chapters on constitutional review, separation of
powers, federalism, and social and economic rights.
26. For overviews of functionalism in comparative law, see, for example, Michele Graziadei,
The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS
100 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Richard Hyland, Comparative Law, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 184 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996);
Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). For classic
statements of functionalist methodology, see, for example, ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 17;
Arthur T. von Mehren, An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law?, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 624
(1971), and Arthur T. von Mehren, The Comparative Study of Law, 6/7 TUL. CIV. L.F. 43 (1991).
27. See, e.g., Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 19, at xiii (noting that “[c]omparativists who
focus on private law sometimes examine the ways in which diverse legal systems address
problems that are functionally similar” and arguing that “[f]unctional inquiries [also] can be
undertaken with constitutional law as their subject matter” but acknowledging the limits of
functional analysis identified by critical comparative law scholars).
28. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 17, at 34.
29. Among the strongest critical statements are Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons:
Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 411 (1985), and Jonathan Hill, Comparative
Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 101 (1989). For other critical
assessments of functionalism, see, for example, Hyland, supra note 26, Mark Tushnet, The
Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Possibilities], and Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some
Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325 (1998)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Returning with Interest]. For a comprehensive review of the criticisms
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illustrating the many ways in which constitutions differ, this first
approach to comparative constitutional law not only provides
valuable knowledge about constitutional variation, but may also
“help dispel the sense of false necessity about the existing
constitutional arrangements in one’s home country . . . .”30
A second approach to comparative constitutional law
scholarship focuses on “constitutional design.”31 As summarized by
Hirschl, this approach uses comparative constitutional law “as a
guide to constructing new constitutional provisions and institutions,
primarily in the context of ‘constitutional engineering’ in the postauthoritarian world or in ethnically-divided polities.”32 Beyond
describing and analyzing differences between constitutions, an
important goal of the constitutional design literature is to prescribe
constitutional solutions that are appropriate for political and social
problems, and critically evaluate constitutional reforms. This
“applied” branch of comparative constitutional law shares the more
descriptive work’s functionalist orientation, with comparative
constitutional law serving as “an ‘école de vérité’ which extends and
enriches the ‘supply of solutions’ and offers the scholar of critical
capacity the opportunity of finding the ‘better solution’ for his time
and place.”33 But the “applied branch” is characterized more by a
spirit of policy advocacy than self-reflection.34
leveled against functionalism and a very preliminary effort to develop a “new functionalism” that
takes the most important criticisms into account while retaining functionalism’s advantages, see
Christopher A. Whytock, Toward a New Functionalism: Comparative Law and Comparative
Methodology (2005) (unpublished manuscript, available from author).
30. JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 169.
31. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY (2001); Lloyd Cutler & Herman
Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511
(1991); Venelin I. Ganev, Emergency Powers and the New East European Constitutions, 45 AM.
J. COMP. L. 585 (1997); Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging
Democracies, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 251; Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin
American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The United States Presidentialism in the Civil Law Melting
Pot, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 29 (2003); Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in
Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 223; Alemante G.
Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 51 (2003).
For a collection of primarily political science work on constitutional design, see THE
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND
DEMOCRACY (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002).
32. Hirschl, supra note 4, at 128.
33. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 17, at 15 (citation omitted).
34. For an overview of U.S. involvement in foreign constitutional reform efforts, see Donald
L. Robinson, The Comparative Study of Constitutions: Suggestions for Organizing the Inquiry, 25
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 272 (1992). For a critical assessment of these efforts, see Jacques deLisle,
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Closely related to constitutional design, a third approach to
comparative
constitutional
law
examines
“constitutional
35
borrowing.”
Rather than prescribing particular constitutional
solutions, this approach is aimed at gaining a better understanding of
the circumstances under which it is appropriate for one country to
adopt another country’s constitutional arrangements or
interpretations.36 An instrumental version of this approach builds on
the concept of constitutional design by emphasizing the conditions
upon which the effectiveness of a constitutional solution depends.37
According to Zweigert and Kötz, one must ask not only whether a
foreign solution “has proved satisfactory in its country of origin,” but
also “whether it will work in the country where it is proposed to
adopt it.”38 A normative version of this approach has taken form in
response to what some scholars perceive as an increasing willingness
of constitutional courts to cite foreign legal opinions on
Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in
the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Tushnet, Returning with Interest, supra note 29; Tushnet, Possibilities, supra
note 29; see also Symposium, Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 177 (2003).
36. Moreover, there is a strong tradition in comparative law scholarship that seeks to explain
more general patterns of cross-national legal borrowing. For a classic example, see ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (Univ. of Ga. Press
2d ed. 1993). See also Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation,
in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue eds.,
2000); William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (2004); William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J. L. &
SOC’Y 203 (2005).
37. A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383,
403 (1996) (“Drafters who borrow an idea from other constitutions or systems may, however, not
understand a principle’s genesis or its implications. The architects of a constitution may be
borrowing a principle or idea from one tradition and applying it to another. Planting a
proposition in a different cultural, historical, or traditional context may lead to results quite
different from those one finds in the country from which the proposition was borrowed.”).
Tushnet refers to this as the “organicist” critique, and attributes it to Montesquieu and Hegel. The
basic argument is that only legal institutions that emerge organically within a society will be
accepted by that society. As Tushnet explains,
Montesquieu observed that ‘the political and civil laws of each nation . . . should be so
appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws
of one nation can suit another.’ This comes close to an express statement that one
constitutional system cannot learn from another. To do so, one people would have to
rely on the experiences that were ‘appropriate to’ another—and were at least
presumptively inappropriate to themselves.
Tushnet, Possibilities, supra note 29, at 1265 (quoting CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1748)).
38. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 17, at 17.
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constitutional matters,39 as well as several recent controversial
instances of foreign law citation by the U.S. Supreme Court.40 Here
the debate has focused on whether references to foreign legal
decisions by courts engaged in domestic constitutional interpretation
can be justified as a matter of constitutional theory and, if so, on the
appropriate methods to apply when using foreign law.41
All of these approaches to comparative constitutional law
scholarship raise interesting and important questions about the causeand-effect
relationships
between
different
constitutional
arrangements on the one hand, and cultural, economic, political and
social differences on the other hand. These causal questions present
themselves in the literature sometimes explicitly and sometimes
implicitly. Generally, they take two basic forms.
First, what accounts for cross-national constitutional
differences? What are the sources of constitutional variation
illustrated so richly by descriptive constitutional law scholarship and
analyzed from a policy perspective by constitutional design scholars?
Under what circumstances are constitutional designers likely to
borrow foreign constitutional arrangements, and when are courts
likely to use foreign legal decisions to help guide domestic
constitutional interpretation? These questions treat constitutional
variation as the phenomenon to be explained. As such, constitutions

39. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Vicki C. Jackson,
Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 91, 91–92 (2004) (“Increasingly, constitutional courts refer to the decisions and reasoning of
other constitutional courts . . . .”); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487
(2005). But see David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical
Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (2006) (indicating through empirical analysis that, at
least in the case of U.S. federal courts, foreign citations are no more common than they were in
the past).
40. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute
criminalizing same-sex sodomy is unconstitutional and citing a decision of the European Court of
Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)). For a concise
overview of the controversy—among not only legal scholars, but also Supreme Court justices and
politicians—see David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, MINN. L. REV. 652, 653–57 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a
Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); David Fontana,
Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); Law, supra note
40; Tushnet, Returning with Interest, supra note 29; Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic
Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239 (2003); Janella Ragwen, Developments, The
Propriety of Independently Referencing International Law, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407 (2007).
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are the dependent variable. Political and other factors may be
explanatory variables that help explain this variation.
Second, what are the consequences of different constitutional
arrangements? This question treats constitutional variation as an
explanatory variable–a factor that may help explain cross-national
social, economic, or political differences, which are treated as
dependent variables. As Nussbaum notes in a special issue on
comparative constitutionalism in The Chicago Journal of
International Law,
A pervasive concern . . . is with outcomes. Whether or not
constitutional provisions and their interpretation have a
prepolitical moral basis, they have consequences. And the
authors appear to agree that both texts and interpretative
traditions can reasonably be evaluated by looking at how
they work. Do they produce stability or instability? Do
they deliver the welfare that they seek to deliver?42
In the instrumental version of the “borrowing literature,” the
question of consequences is explicit: under what circumstances are
borrowed foreign solutions likely to have their intended effect? This
question implicitly flows through all of the functionally oriented
comparative constitutional law scholarship, even though
functionalism itself does not explicitly grapple with the issue of
causality.43 By illustrating constitutional variation in the face of
similar social problems, the descriptive work may indeed help
diminish a sense of false necessity about existing domestic
solutions—but without clarifying the actual consequences of the
status quo and likely consequences of proposed alternatives, this
42. Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction to Comparative Constitutionalism, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L.
429, 433 (2002).
43. In the “new functionalism” that I propose elsewhere, I argue that the question of
consequences should be explicitly addressed, and that this can be done by distinguishing intended
function and actual consequences. Whytock, supra note 29. This distinction is similar to the
distinction made in traditional sociological and anthropological functionalism between manifest
and latent functions. MARK ABRAHAMSON, FUNCTIONALISM 17 (1978). Compare id. (“[Latent
functions] involve consequences that are neither recognized nor intended by participants. Thus,
initiation ceremonies may change male identities even though neither initiates nor adult males are
aware of this consequence. Manifest functions, by contrast, contribute to adjustment or
perpetuation of a system in ways that are both intended and recognized by participants.”), with
Robert F. Spencer, The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Anthropology, in FUNCTIONALISM
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE STRENGTH AND LIMITS OF FUNCTIONALISM IN ANTHROPOLOGY,
ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIOLOGY 6–9 (Don Martindale ed., 1965) (offering an
anthropological perspective).
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approach does not provide a strong foundation for reflecting on the
relative merits of different constitutional arrangements.
The
constitutional design literature aspires to accomplish this by moving
beyond reflection to prescription. Prescriptive claims, however,
depend on causal claims about the real world consequences of
proposed constitutional arrangements. Finally, it would seem that
most normative approaches to the question of constitutional
borrowing would consider the opportunity costs of rejecting an
alternative solely on the grounds that it is foreign when its adoption
might provide significant societal benefits, as well as the potentially
costly unintended consequences of borrowing.44
*****
My central claim is this: causal questions permeate the field of
comparative constitutional law.
The field therefore poses
fundamental challenges of causal inference—challenges about how
one can gain knowledge about the effects that one thing may have on
another, even in the face of limited evidence and the inability to
perform controlled experiments on constitutional matters.45 But so
far comparative constitutional law scholarship has done little to
address these challenges, leaving interesting and important questions
unanswered and causal claims empirically unsupported.
Consequently, the field is far short of the type of constitutional

44. Zweigert and Kötz argue that “[i]f comparative analysis suggests the adoption of a
particular solution to a problem arrived at in another system one cannot reject the proposal simply
because the solution is foreign and ipso facto unacceptable. . . . ‘The reception of foreign legal
institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a
thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine
just because it didn’t grow in his back garden.’” ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 17, at 17
(quoting RUDOLPH VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 1 (9th ed. 1955)). This,
however, is not as compelling an argument as it is in the case of morally charged constitutional
issues on relatively technical legal issues, and it also downplays important questions about the
“constitutional license” for borrowing. See, e.g., Tushnet, Possibilities, supra note 29; Alford,
supra note 41. Nevertheless, one would want to know the practical implications of a decision to
accept or reject a foreign alternative. Both constitutional principle and societal consequences are
relevant to constitutional analysis. Elsewhere I take some very preliminary steps toward a
positive theoretical investigation of the consequences of foreign law in domestic courts.
Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Law in Domestic Courts: Different Uses, Different
Implications, in GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND
THE CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION OF LEGAL NORMS (Donald W. Jackson, Michael C. Tolley &
Mary L. Volcansek eds. forthcoming).
45. For an overview of the logic of causal inference, see GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING
SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ch. 3 (1994), and Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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theorizing that, by shedding light on the consequences of
constitutions, might help “inform the public, guide politicians, and
improve the decisions of courts.”46 As Hirschl argues, the study of
comparative constitutions has remained predominantly descriptive
and conceptual, and has failed to treat claims about causal
relationships as hypotheses that need to be tested against empirical
evidence.47 Simply put, “causal inference—arguably, the ultimate
goal of scientific inquiry, quantitative or qualitative, positivist or
hermeneutical—remains largely beyond the purview of comparative
constitutional law scholarship.”48 Hirschl correctly emphasizes that
his critique in no way diminishes the importance of the descriptive
and conceptual contributions made by comparative constitutional law
scholars.49 I would go even further: the causal questions and claims
in comparative constitutional law scholarship that have yet to be
rigorously investigated demonstrate the considerable potential of the
comparative constitutional endeavor. By making these questions and
claims explicit in their work and by addressing them with appropriate
tools of causal inference—that is, by taking causality seriously—
scholars of comparative constitutional law can help ensure that the
field will acquire and retain the prominent place it deserves in legal
scholarship.

46. COOTER, supra note 5, at 2.
47. See Hirschl, supra note 4, at 126 (identifying four major types of comparative
constitutional scholarship: “(1) freestanding, single-country studies mistakenly characterized as
comparative . . . ; (2) comparative reference aimed at self-reflection through analogy, distinction,
and contrast; (3) comparative research aimed at generating ‘thick’ concepts and thinking tools
through multi-faceted descriptions; and (4) studies that draw upon controlled comparison and
inference-oriented case selection principles in order to assess change, explain dynamics, and
make inferences about cause and effect through systematic case selection and analysis of data,”
and noting that there has been very little of the fourth type of scholarship); see also COOTER,
supra note 5, at 374 (noting the lack of empirical work on constitutions in general).
48. Hirschl, supra note 4, at 153.
49. Id. (explaining that “the field has made a remarkable leap forward over the past few
years—primarily through comparative research aimed at generating thick, multi-faceted
descriptions, concepts, and thinking tools”). But Hirschl also urges comparative constitutionalists
“to further release themselves from traditional doctrinal constraints, and contribute more
significantly to the accumulation of theoretical knowledge through the deployment of more
methodologically rigorous methods of research design.” Id. at 152–53 (“[M]ost leading works in
the field still lag behind the social sciences in their ability to use controlled comparison to trace
causal links among pertinent variables.”).
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III. COMPARATIVE POLITICS, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY,
AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
If my argument is convincing so far—if comparative
constitutional law scholarship raises interesting and important causal
questions, but generally does not grapple with the challenges of
causal inference—then comparative constitutional law scholars may
be interested in the work of political scientists working in the
subfields of comparative politics and comparative political
economy.50 These scholars, along with a growing number of
economists, are asking questions about the origins and consequences
of constitutions, questions that are similar to those raised in the
comparative constitutional law literature. Yet they are framing these
questions in explicitly causal terms, developing positive theory from
which hypothetical answers can be derived, and then testing them
empirically using social science methods of causal inference.
Without making any attempt to be comprehensive, I will review
some of the relevant literature in order to highlight interesting
empirical findings of political scientists and economists who have
studied constitutions in comparative perspective, provide a
bibliographical point of departure for comparative constitutional law
scholars who are not already familiar with this literature, and
reinforce the importance of comparative constitutional law as a field
of study.
A. Comparative Politics:
The Political Origins and Consequences of Constitutions
Comparative politics scholars have been particularly interested
in three basic constitutional features: electoral systems, federalism,
and separation of powers. Their research has treated them as both
dependent variables and explanatory variables.
Research on
constitutions as dependent variables explores political explanations
for cross-national constitutional variation. For example, Carles Boix
has done important research on the origins of electoral systems. He

50. My focus on political science and political economy is intended to illustrate the potential
contributions of these fields, and not to suggest that other social science disciplines, such as
anthropology, economics, and sociology, do not have their own, equally important contributions
to make to the study of comparative constitutional law. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele,
Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 389 (2004) (drawing on
anthropology).
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finds that the ruling parties at the time of an electoral reform consider
different electoral arrangements in light of the consequences they
expect different systems to have on their future electoral prospects,
and then choose the electoral system that they anticipate will
maximize their political representation.51
Challenging Boix’s
findings, Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice note
that proportional representation electoral systems are closely linked
to more government spending, more redistribution, and more
frequent center-left governments, and ask why, given this
relationship, the right would ever endorse proportional
representation. They argue that forward-looking right politicians
will favor majoritarian institutions, whereas forward-looking left
politicians will favor proportional representation.52 Regarding the
basic constitutional choice between presidential and parliamentary
government, Gerald Easter finds that it is primarily a function of the
interests and status of the pre-reform regime.53 Similarly, Timothy
Frye develops what he calls an “electoral bargaining approach” to
constitutional design, arguing that two main factors account for the
variation in presidential powers of post-communist countries: “the
bargaining power of the electoral favorite and the degree of
uncertainty over the electoral outcome.”54 What these different
51. According to Boix: (1) if the electoral arena does not change and the current electoral
regime benefits the ruling parties, the electoral system is not changed; (2) if the entry of new
voters or a change in voters’ preferences alter the electoral arena leading to new parties, then (a)
if the new parties are strong, the old parties (i) shift from plurality/majority to PR if no old party
enjoys a dominant position but (ii) maintain non-PR system if there is a dominant old party, or (b)
if the new parties are weak, non-PR is maintained regardless of old party positions. Carles Boix,
Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, 93
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 609 (1999).
52. Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Specific Interests and the Origins of
Electoral Institutions 6–9 (2004) (unpublished), available at http://www.people.fas.
harvard.edu/~iversen/pdffiles/CusackIversenSoskice2004.pdf.
Other comparative politics
research addressing the origin of electoral systems includes Thomas F. Remington & Steven S.
Smith, Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian
Parliamentary Election Law, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1253 (1996), and Kenneth Benoit & John W.
Schiemann, Institutional Choices in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary’s 1989
Electoral Law, 13 J. THEORETICAL POL. 153 (2001).
53. Gerald M. Easter, Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in
Russia and the NIS, 49 WORLD POL. 184 (1997).
54. Timothy Frye, A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies, 30
COMP. POL. STUD. 523, 524 (1997). On the origins of different constitutional arrangements, see
also Matthew Soberg Shugart, The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive
Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1 (1998) (finding
that there is an inverse relationship between party strength (the extent to which legislators
campaign on the basis of their parties’ reputations as providers of public policy, as opposed to
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findings have in common is that constitutional variation is to a large
extent explained by political power, political interests, and political
expectations, rather than technical design principles.55 This research
does not necessarily question the importance of constitutions, but it
raises the question asked by comparative politics and legal scholar
Donald Horowitz: Is constitutional design an oxymoron?56 On the
one hand, the answer might be no. Constitutions are designed, albeit
designed to serve the interests of powerful political interests. But if
one understands constitutional design in the functionalist sense, as a
plan for solving social problems rather than a result of political
bargaining, then the research suggests that the answer may be yes.57
Comparative politics scholars have also studied constitutions as
explanatory variables, engaging in positive theory development and
empirical research on the political consequences of different
constitutional arrangements. From this perspective, they have, for
example, treated democratic stability and ethnic conflict as
dependent variables, that is, as outcomes that can be partly explained
by cross-national constitutional differences.58 A major debate in
personal reputations as providers of more narrowly targeted services) and executive strength (the
constitutional authority of the executive to influence policy independent of partisan support in the
legislature)), and JOSEP M. COLOMER, STRATEGIC TRANSITIONS: GAME THEORY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION (2000) (emphasizing the bargaining power and electoral expectations of
incumbents).
55. In their interesting article on constitutional borrowing as institutional design, Lee Epstein
and Jack Knight summarize the argument as follows: “[W]e must analyze borrowing—
institutional choices, really—as a bargaining process among relevant political actors, with their
decisions reflecting their relative influence, preferences, and beliefs at the moment when the new
institution is introduced, along with (and critically so) their level of uncertainty about future
political circumstances.”
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and
Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 196, 200 (2003).
56. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: NOMOS XLII, at 253 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
57. This raises another problem with the traditional functionalist method of comparative
law—who defines the “problems” which laws are intended to “solve”? Whytock, supra note 29.
58. Comparative politics scholars also have found relationships between electoral systems
and the number of political parties. See, e.g., GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTES COUNT:
STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE WORLD’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 8–9 (1997) (electoral
institutions alone do not determine the number of parties; they impose upper bounds on the
number of parties. The actual number of parties is an interactive function of electoral and social
structure); MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN
THE MODERN STATE 216–28 (Barbara North & Robert North trans., Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1954)
(1951) (plurality electoral systems tend to lead to two-party systems). Comparative politics
scholars have further found relationships between electoral systems and levels of government
corruption. See, e.g., Eric C.C. Chang & Miriam A. Golden, Electoral Systems, District
Magnitude and Corruption (July 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=713521; Jana Kunicova & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules as Constraints on
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comparative politics is about whether presidential constitutional
designs reduce democratic stability. Juan Linz finds that presidential
systems are indeed less stable than parliamentary systems, in part
because they make deadlock likely between the president and the
legislature.59 José Cheibub and Fernando Limongi agree with the
basic empirical finding that presidential regimes are less stable than
parliamentary regimes, but disagree with Linz and others about the
underlying causal mechanisms: “if parliamentary regimes have a
better record of survival than presidential regimes, it is not because
they are parliamentary.”60 Shugart and Carey, on the other hand,
argue that one cannot generalize about presidentialism and regime
stability because presidential regimes vary substantially and interact
in different ways with different sets of presidential powers and rules
of executive-legislative relations. They do find, however, that
presidential systems with greater presidential powers are likely to be
less stable.61
As this brief summary of the debate over
presidentialism and democratic stability shows, identifying empirical
patterns is only one part of empirically oriented comparative
constitutional law scholarship. It is also only one step toward
reducing uncertainty about causal inferences—association is not
Corruption: The Risks of Closed-List Proportional Representation, (Jan. 15, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&
content=berkeley_law_econ). No discussion of comparative political economy scholarship on
comparative constitutions would be complete without mentioning George Tsebelis’s work on
veto players. See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
WORK (2002). He treats the number of veto players, including the actors specified by the
constitution that must agree in order to change the status quo (for example, the U.S. Constitution
requires the agreement of the House, the Senate, and the president—barring a veto override—to
enact legislation), as a key explanatory variable that helps explain various political and economic
outcomes. Id.
59. Juan Linz argues that this is because presidential systems, among other things, have
fixed terms for the chief executive, which creates rigidity by precluding continuous policy
readjustment, with the result that disputes between the president and legislature are likely to be
resolved by extraconstitutional means. Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J.
DEMOCRACY 51, 68 (1990); see also ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950–1990, at 106–
36 (2000) (finding that presidential democracies are less durable than parliamentary ones under
all economic and political conditions).
60. José Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, Democratic Institutions and Regime
Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered, 5 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
151, 176 (2002).
61. SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 20, at chs. 3, 8; see also TSEBELIS, supra note 58, at ch.
9 (agreeing on the basis of veto player theory that regime survival should be lower when
presidential powers are higher, because strong presidential powers in effect introduce another
veto player, thus increasing policy stability which, in turn, increases regime instability).

WHYTOCK

Winter 2008]

TAKING CAUSALITY SERIOUSLY

647

causation. Causal inference also depends on positive theoretical
work aimed at identifying causal processes, and empirical
examination of the observable implications of those processes.
Different constitutional provisions may also have different
consequences for ethnic conflict in divided societies. Arend Lijphart
argues that consociational governments, which include proportional
representation electoral systems, can reduce ethnic conflict by
helping to ensure that all segments of society are represented in
government.62 In contrast, Donald Horowitz argues for electoral
systems that foster interethnic cooperation by creating incentives for
vote pooling among different ethnic groups.63 Nancy Bermeo finds
that federal institutions generally help promote interethnic
accommodation,64 whereas Michael Hechter finds the implications
more ambiguous: on the one hand, decentralization leads to reduced
rebellion events; on the other hand, decentralization leads to
increased protest events.65 Too little decentralization can lead to
rebellion, but too much can lead to fragmentation.66
Political scientists have devoted considerable attention—albeit
so far more theoretical than empirical—to the question of whether
and how constitutions actually constrain the behavior of government
actors. Adam Przeworski responds, “It is obvious that at times they
do not.”67 Reasoning that constitutions are written under specific
62. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION
(1977).
63. Electoral systems can be designed to fragment ethnic groups politically by creating intraparty competition, to foster moderation in order to pool votes, and to facilitate the formation of
multi-ethnic parties and coalitions. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Conflict Management for
Policymakers, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 115 (Joseph V.
Montville ed., 1990). For example, improvements over closed-list PR and first-past-the-post
(“FPP”) in terms of incentives may include preferential electoral systems like the alternative vote
(which, unlike FPP, allow voters to rank their choices among different candidates or parties). Id.;
see also STEVEN I. WILKINSON, VOTES AND VIOLENCE: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND ETHNIC
RIOTS IN INDIA 241 (2004) (criticizing Lijphart’s approach, and finding that “even within the
same constitutional structure in India there is substantial intrastate variation in ethnic violence,
due to different levels of political competition”).
64. Her logic is that more layers of government create more settings for peaceful bargaining
and give at least some regional elites a greater stake in existing political institutions. Nancy
Bermeo, A New Look at Federalism: The Import of Institutions, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 99 (2002).
65. Michael Hechter, Nationalism and Rationality, 35 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 3, 14
(2000).
66. Id.
67. Adam Przeworski, Do Constitutions Constrain? 1 (Oct. 16, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_events/symposia/constitutions/papers/
przeworski_paper.pdf.
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historical conditions to regulate government under future conditions,
he argues that “[w]hen the future departs too far from the
anticipations, constitutions either bend or break.”68 Russell Hardin
argues that constitutions are not “contracts” but rather an instrument
for coordination. According to him, “Once a coordination is in place
and people are following it, the cost of re-coordinating is the chief
obstacle to moving to any supposedly superior order. This cost can
block re-coordination even if it would be in virtually everyone’s
interest to be in a new order.”69 According to Barry Weingast,
governments comply with limitations on their power when they
believe that violating those limitations will lead to concerted action
by citizens to depose the government or withdraw support.70
68. Id. at 2.
69. RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 15–16 (1999).
As Hardin elaborates,
Although its rationale in part is similar, this is not the system of checks and
balances envisioned by Montesquieu. It is a finer grained application of Madison’s
injunction: “Ambition must be made to counter ambition.” . . . To be sure, I block your
action because I think it is wrong. But I do so with substantial support that makes my
action costless or even beneficial to me. Similarly, I do my job well because others
will generally support and reward me for working well. Moreover, it would be
difficult to disrupt this system to anyone’s benefit, including that of a national
president or prime minister.
Id. at 26 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)). But Hardin is not completely
optimistic: “Such a conventional norm system may not work equally well at all levels or in all
circumstances” and he does not claim that “such a system can never be abused for essentially
self-interested purposes.” Id. However, “its force can be seen in recent decades in the forced
removal from office of legislators, high-ranking bureaucrats, presidential advisers, a president,
and a vice-president in the United States, and of ministers and other high-ranking officials in
Japan and several European nations, most notably Italy in recent years.” Id. Moreover, if a
constitution provides coordination on a central program, “there is much less need to have an
external force to control the government to make it comply with the constitutional order. Hence,
constitutional government is feasibly workable. It can fail, however, if the central coordination
requires great power that can be used for purposes other than managing the programme on which
we have coordinated. In that case, the constitutional order can fail utterly.” Id. at 28. Adam
Przeworski makes a similar argument, although not with reference to coordination or focal points:
“[C]ompliance can be self-enforcing if the institutional framework is designed in such a way that
the state is not a third party but an agent of coalitions of political forces.” ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA 25 (1991); see also José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Introduction,
in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 1, 11–12 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski
eds., 2003) (“[A] system of checks and balances leads the government as a whole to act in ways
that are predictable and moderate when (1) these institutions have means and incentives to check
one another and (2) when their institutional prerogatives are backed by support from organized
interests.”).
70. See Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,
91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 261 (1997) [hereinafter Weingast, Foundations I]; Barry R.
Weingast, A Postscript to “Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” in
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However, if the government believes that citizens are unable to act in
concert to defend their rights, those limitations will not be selfenforcing.71 Maintaining limits on government is, therefore, a
“massive social coordination problem.”72 Citizens must coordinate
about which limits on governmental power are to be defended and
how they are defined. Otherwise, collective action will be
impossible.73 Constitutions can provide a focal solution to this
problem by specifying “widely accepted and unambiguous limits on
the state.”74 Under these circumstances, the rule of law will be selfenforcing, since the government factors the risk of losing citizen
support into its interest calculations.
B. Comparative Political Economy:
The Economic Consequences of Constitutions
As illustrated above, political scientists studying comparative
politics have devoted considerable attention to the study of
constitutions, with an emphasis on their political origins and political
consequences. They have provided evidence that cross-national
constitutional variation matters for outcomes including democratic
stability and ethnic conflict. Recent work by political scientists and
economists studying comparative political economy suggests that the
implications of comparative constitutional law are even wider.
Political economy is the study of the relationship between political
institutions and economic outcomes, including both economic
policies and actual economic performance.75 A central premise of
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 69, at 109, 113 [hereinafter Weingast,
Foundations II].
71. Weingast, Foundations I, supra note 70, at 246.
72. Id. at 261.
73. Weingast, Foundations II, supra note 70, at 111. Moreover, absent an effective focal
point, a government may attempt to “divide and conquer” citizens by co-opting certain groups to
form coalitions against others, thereby blunting citizen attempts to enforce compliance. Id.
74. Weingast, Foundations I, supra note 70, at 261.
75. As James Alt explains, political economists generally understand institutions as “rules,
procedures, norms, or conventions designed self-consciously to determine ‘who has the power to
do what when.’” James E. Alt, Comparative Political Economy: Credibility, Accountability, and
Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 147, 149 (Ira Katzelson &
Helen V. Milner eds., 2002). Political economists study:
how political and economic institutions constrain, direct, and reflect individual
behavior. It explains collective outcomes like production, resource allocation, and
public policy in a unified way, stressing the political context in which market
phenomena take place and using an economic approach, constrained maximizing and
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political economy is that these outcomes are influenced not only by
economic and social conditions, but also by political factors,
including institutions.76 Institutions affect these outcomes because
they provide the context within which economic decisions are
made—they determine who gets to decide, they impose limits on the
choices available, they create incentives and disincentives for
making different choices, and they prescribe norms of behavior.77
Comparative political economy is the branch of political economy
that explores the relationship between cross-national institutional
differences and cross-national economic differences.
1. Comparative Political Economy and
Comparative “Private” Law
Comparative political economy scholars in both political science
and economics are increasingly interested in the economic
consequences of law and legal institutions, although the focus has
been primarily on private law.78 Economist Andrei Shleifer and his
coauthors focus on the economic consequences of legal origins,
finding, among other things, that even after controlling for
differences in economic development, “French civil law countries
have less secure property rights, greater government regulation and
intervention, greater government ownership of banks and industry,
and higher levels of corruption and red tape than do common law
countries” and that “common law countries are more financially

strategic behavior by self-interested agents. In sum, it emphasizes economic behavior
in the political process and political behavior in the marketplace.
Id.
76. Id. at 148.
77. See id. at 150 (The institutional context “limits, constrains, channels, and determines
what is available to choose, how choices from this feasible set are made, and who gets to make
these choices”).
78. Much of this research is inspired by economist Douglass North’s work on the role of
institutions in economic performance, particularly DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). Within the discipline of
economics, this field sometimes is referred to as the “new comparative economics.” See, e.g.,
Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 (2003). The
World Bank has a group that works on the “Legal Institutions of the Market Economy.” See
World Bank, Law & Justice, http://www.1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/index.cfm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007). I use the term “private law” for convenience only; I have doubts about its
analytic utility. See, e.g., Shapiro (1972), supra note 17 (criticizing the public law/private law
distinction). For example, property rights are as much a part of public law as private law.
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developed than their civil law counterparts.”79
In contrast,
economists Daniel Berkowitz and Jean-Francois Richard, along with
legal scholar Katharina Pistor, find that the effectiveness of legal
institutions and, indirectly, economic development, depend more on
the manner in which those institutions were transplanted, than on the
institutions’ origins.80 Moving beyond legal origins, other scholars
have found that property rights institutions have an important impact
on long-run economic growth, but that contracting institutions are
less important;81 that cross-national variation in corporate and
securities law affects corporate valuations;82 and that the quality of a
country’s domestic legal institutions affects its international trade
flows.83 Peter Hall and David Soskice have developed an entire
approach to comparative political economy that is based largely on
cross-national legal and regulatory differences, including differences
in contracting institutions.84
Of course, law and economics scholars are also interested in the
relationships between law and legal institutions on the one hand, and
economics on the other hand;85 thus, it has strong affinities with
79. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193, 1220 (2002).
For more detailed empirical findings regarding the effects of legal origins, see Rafael La Porta et
al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (arguing that common law countries have
the strongest and French civil law countries the weakest legal protections of investors), Rafael La
Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999) (countries that use
French laws have inferior government performance in terms of public sector efficiency, quality of
public good provision, government size, and political freedom), and Thorsten Beck et al., Law
and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter? (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=355820 (cross-country differences in legal origins are determinants of
financial development).
80. Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47
EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003). As the authors note, “The policy implication of these results are
fundamental: a legal reform strategy should aim at improving legality by carefully choosing legal
rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is appreciated by domestic law
makers, law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the final consumer of these rules.” Id. at
192.
81. Daron Acemoglu & Simon H. Johnson, Unbundling Institutions (July 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=442900).
82. For a review of this research, see Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and
Financial Development (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=636556.
83. Daniel Berkowitz et al., Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 163 (2004).
84. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
85. For overviews of law and economics, see, for example, ROBERT COOTER, LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2004), and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2003).
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political economy. Given the increasingly widespread use of the
tools of law and economics by comparative law scholars, there are
important links with comparative political economy in particular.86
Generally, however, the work of political economists has placed a
greater emphasis on the development and empirical testing of
positive theories about actual relationships between legal and
economic variables.87 In addition, like most law-related comparative
political economy scholarship, law and economics has devoted less
attention to constitutional law than to “private law” subjects such as
contract and tort law.88
Because of the relative lack of empirical work in comparative
law and economics, and because both comparative law and
economics and comparative political economy scholars have devoted
relatively little attention to comparative constitutional law, favoring
instead the study of private law, there is an important gap in the
literature. As Table 1 illustrates,89 there already has been significant
normative and positive theoretical work on the relationship between
economics on the one hand, and comparative private law (Quadrant
I) and comparative constitutional law (Quadrant II) on the other
hand. Moreover, there is a rapidly growing body of empirical
research on comparative law and economics (Quadrant III), albeit
one that has yet to devote substantial attention to comparative
constitutional law. Quadrant IV represents a wide open frontier for
comparative legal scholarship that develops and empirically tests
theories about the economic consequences of constitutions.
86. For contributions by a leading figure in comparative law and economics, see MATTEI,
supra note 6.
87. See Alt, supra note 75, at 150 (“Relative to economics, a contribution of political science
is to accord equal status to normative and positive questions, focusing relatively less on optimal
arrangements and more on figuring out how things actually work.”). Of course, this is not to say
that law and economics scholars are not concerned with positive theory and empirical testing—
indeed, there is a subfield of positive law and economics. To reemphasize my qualification, I
only mean to suggest a difference in emphasis.
88. Ugo Mattei—a leader in the field of comparative law and economics—notes that “while
law and economics has made valuable contributions to the understanding of private law, its
contribution to public law is less impressive and in that area much work still has to be done.”
MATTEI, supra note 6, at x. But see COOTER, supra note 5 (applying economic analysis to
constitutional law).
89. The four quadrants are, of course, closely related and mutually dependent. Most
importantly, the value of positive theory and empirical testing depends not only on its ability to
generate knowledge, but on the normative and policy implications of that knowledge.
Conversely, normative and positive theoretical work that does not take into account real world
consequences has its own limitations.

WHYTOCK

Winter 2008]

TAKING CAUSALITY SERIOUSLY

653

TABLE 1: FRONTIERS IN COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS90
Comparative
Private Law

Comparative
Constitutional Law

Normative and Positive
Theory

I. Mattei (1997)

II. Cooter (2000)

Empirical Testing

III. Glaeser & Shleifer
(2002), Berkowitz et al.
(2003)

IV. Empirical
Comparative
Constitutional Law

2. Comparative Political Economy and
Comparative Constitutional Law
Recently, however, there has been a surge of interest among
comparative political economists in constitutions.91 In particular,
they have focused on the economic consequences of constitutional
arrangements governing legislative elections, federalism, and
separation of powers, treating these features as explanatory variables
and various economic outcomes as dependent variables. Research on
the economic consequences of electoral systems has focused on
whether the electoral formula is based on a plurality rule (typically
associated with “majoritarian” electoral systems), in which case the
candidate with the highest number of votes in a particular district
wins that district, or proportional representation (“PR”), in which
case legislative seats are allocated approximately in proportion to the
respective vote shares of the competing political parties.92 In their

90. This table is by no means intended to list comprehensively the relevant literature. It only
lists one or two exemplars for each quadrant, and of course omits many important works, only
some of which are discussed in the brief review included in this article.
91. For one important empirical contribution, see TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS (2003), which I discuss below.
92. For a clear and concise overview of electoral systems in comparative perspective, see
AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN
THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES ch. 8 (1999). As Lijphart summarizes:
The plurality and majority single-member district methods are winner-take-all
methods—the candidate supported by the largest number of voters wins, and all other
voters remain unrepresented—and hence a perfect reflection of majoritarian
philosophy. Moreover, the party gaining a nationwide majority or plurality of the
votes will tend to be overrepresented in terms of parliamentary seats. In sharp contrast,
the basic aim of proportional representation is to represent both majorities and
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book The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Torsten Persson and
Guido Tabellini analyze cross-national data from 80 democratic
countries and find that majoritarian systems lead to lower overall
government spending, lower spending on welfare programs, and
smaller government deficits than PR systems.93 Similarly, using
cross-sectional time series data from 14 democratic countries,
Torben Iversen and David Soskice find that PR systems redistribute
wealth more than majoritarian systems, because center-left
governments dominate in PR systems, whereas center-right
governments dominate in majoritarian systems.94
Regarding federalism, Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels
analyze cross-sectional time series data from 15 federal systems, and
find that increased decentralization of expenditures—defined as the
percentage of total public sector spending conducted by subnational
governments rather than the central government—reduces overall
fiscal deficits and inflation.95 Using cross-sectional time series data
from 44 countries, Rodden also finds that when fiscal
decentralization is funded by direct transfers from the central
government to subnational governments, the result is faster growth in
overall government spending, whereas it is associated with slower
growth in government spending when it is funded by autonomous
local taxation.96
The comparative political economy research on separation of
powers generally focuses on executive-legislative relations and treats
the presence or absence of a confidence requirement as a key
explanatory variable. The existence of a confidence requirement,
which is one of the defining features of parliamentary government,
minorities and, instead of overrepresenting or underrepresenting any parties, to
translate votes into seats proportionally.
Id. at 143.
93. For a summary of their findings, see PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 270–76.
Similarly, Carles Boix finds that the public sector is larger in PR countries. See CARLES BOIX,
DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION 189 (2003).
94. See Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Electoral Institutions and the Politics of
Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 165
(2006).
95. See Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, Beyond the Fiction of Federalism:
Macroeconomic Management in Multilateral Systems, 54 WORLD POL. 494 (2002). They define
fiscal federalism in terms of the percentage of total public sector spending conducted by
subnational governments. Id. at 503.
96. See Jonathan Rodden, Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of
Government, 57 INT’L ORG. 695 (2003).
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allows the legislature to dismiss the head of the government from
office by a vote of no confidence or censure.97 In presidential
systems, on the other hand, the head of government is elected to
serve for a constitutionally prescribed period of time, and cannot be
removed except by impeachment.98 Using cross-sectional data from
80 countries, Persson and Tabellini find that presidential systems—
which they operationalize as the absence of a confidence
requirement—lead to lower overall government spending, and
apparently lower welfare spending, relative to parliamentary forms
of government.99
Similarly, using time series data from
approximately 65 countries, Boix finds that presidentialism has a
negative effect on the size of the public sector, with public revenue
about 4 percent of GDP lower than in parliamentary systems.100
Perhaps the most ambitious effort to date aimed at establishing
the relationship between constitutions and economic and social
outcomes is John Gerring, Strom Thacker, and Carola Moreno’s
research on centripetal democratic governance. They examine the
collective impact of electoral systems, federalism, and separation of
powers.101
Conceptually, the authors distinguish centripetal
government, which is unitary, parliamentary, and has a PR electoral
system, and decentralized government, which is federal, presidential,
and has a majoritarian electoral system.102 Using cross-sectional
times series data from 77 to 126 countries (depending on the
statistical model), they find that centripetalism is associated with

97. For an overview of executive-legislative relations in comparative perspective, see
LIJPHART, supra note 92, ch. 7. As Lijphart explains, the presence or absence of a confidence
requirement is only one of the characteristics that distinguish parliamentary government from
presidential government. Id. The two other key characteristics are whether the head of
government is popularly elected (yes in presidential systems, but in parliamentary systems the
prime minister is selected by the legislature) and whether the executive is collegial (as in the case
of a prime minister’s cabinet, in which the most important decisions are made by the cabinet as a
whole) or noncollegial (as in the case of a presidential cabinet, in which cabinet members are
subordinate to the president). Id. at 117–18.
98. Id. at 117.
99. For a summary of these findings, see PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 273–76.
100. BOIX, supra note 93, at 189.
101. John Gerring et al., Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry,
99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (2005).
102. Id. at 571. As the authors explain, “The centralist theory . . . presumes that good
governance flows from institutions that centralize power in a single locus of sovereignty. The
decentralist theory . . . supposes that good governance arises from the diffusion of power among
multiple independent bodies.” Id. at 567.
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higher bureaucratic quality, higher tax revenues, better investment
ratings, more trade openness, greater economic prosperity, fewer
infant deaths, longer life expectancy, and lower rates of illiteracy.103
By focusing on specific findings, the foregoing review runs the
risk of exaggerating the conclusions drawn by comparative politics
and comparative political economy scholars about the consequences
of constitutions. These findings are by no means conclusive. Rather,
they represent efforts, using social science methods, to take questions
of causality seriously in comparative constitutional law by
attempting to reduce and estimate the uncertainty of causal
inferences about the relationships between different constitutional
arrangements on the one hand, and various political and economic
factors on the other.104 In some cases the methods used are
qualitative or “small-N,” and in others they are statistical or “largeN.” Nonetheless, the goal of reducing the uncertainty of causal
inferences is the same.105 A related point is that constitutions are not,
of course, the only factors that influence political and economic
outcomes. Other causal factors may be of equal or greater
importance, and many of them are likely to remain beyond the reach
of scholars’ understanding. However, a central aim of comparative
politics and comparative political economy scholarship is to isolate
the effects of institutional variables by controlling for the effects of
other variables.
The findings summarized above should be
103. Id. at 576.
104. This is not to say that the evidence is conclusive, and the authors do not claim that it is.
To the contrary, as Lee Epstein and Gary King explain:
[N]o matter how perfect the research design, no matter how much data we collect, and
no matter how much time, effort, and research resources we expend, we will never be
able to make causal inferences with certainty. . . . Simply because uncertainty cannot
be eliminated does not mean we cannot or should not draw causal inferences when the
research necessitates it. Legal researchers, lawyers, the courts, and legislators need to
make causal inferences, and so giving up and redefining the goal is not an option.
Moreover, generating useful, policy-relevant research topics is among the things that
legal scholars do best. We thus recommend that researchers not change the object of
their inferences because causal inference is difficult. Instead, they should make their
questions as precise as possible, follow the best advice science has to offer about
reducing uncertainty and bias, and communicate the appropriate level of uncertainty
readers should have in interpreting their results . . . .
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (2002).
105. Ran Hirschl reviews how qualitative methods can be applied to reduce the uncertainty of
causal inferences in comparative constitutional law that should be extremely useful to
comparative constitutional law scholars. See Hirschl, supra note 4. Below I provide one example
of how statistical methods can be applied in furtherance of the same goal.
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understood in this context: they are findings about the distinct effects
of different constitutional arrangements after attempting to control
for other factors, and they are not claims that other factors do not
matter or are necessarily less important.
*****
Comparative politics and comparative political economy
research has produced a wide range of empirically supported causal
inferences about the relationships between different constitutional
arrangements on the one hand, and various political and economic
factors on the other hand. These findings shed light on the ways in
which politics influences constitutional arrangements, and on the
ways in which constitutions can help explain important political and
economic outcomes—including democratic stability, ethnic conflict,
government spending, and fiscal deficits. By doing so, they
reinforce the real world importance of comparative constitutional
law.
This brief review also reveals one of the ways that legal scholars
can add value to the emerging body of empirical comparative
constitutional law research. Most of the comparative politics and
comparative political economics scholarship on constitutions has
focused on fairly blunt constitutional distinctions: majoritarian
versus proportional electoral systems, federal versus non-federal
systems, and presidential versus parliamentary systems.106 With their
expertise on the many other ways that constitutions vary crossnationally and their familiarity with the nuances of constitutional
processes, legal scholars are well positioned to play a leading role
not only in refining existing theoretical and empirical approaches,
but also in developing distinctive new approaches to empirical
comparative constitutional law.
By focusing on findings, this review of the literature has not
illustrated how political scientists and economists are using social
106. This approach has not gone uncriticized. See, e.g., SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 20;
John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank
Ordering of Electoral Formulas, 14 ELECTORAL STUD. 417 (1995) (proposing a more finegrained typology of electoral systems); Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 95, at 495 (noting the
complaint “that scholars place too much emphasis on differences between federal and unitary
systems and not enough on the institutional, political, and cultural diversity within these two
types”); Alan Siaroff, Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, SemiPresidential and Parliamentary Distinction, 42 EUR. J. POL. RES. 287 (2003) (proposing more
fine-grained typologies of presidential systems).
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science methods of causal inference to reduce the uncertainty of their
findings. This is the task of the next part of this article.
IV. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
GOVERNMENT SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
I have argued that comparative constitutional law raises
interesting and important causal questions, but that comparative
constitutional law scholarship so far has done relatively little to
address these questions systematically. How might this be done?
The approach in comparative politics and comparative political
economy is to apply social science methods of causal inference.
Although the literature on social science methodology and causation
is vast, there are several texts that should prove very useful to
comparative constitutional law scholars who are interested in these
techniques.107 Moreover, there recently has been renewed interest
among legal scholars in empirical legal studies, a major focus of
which is the use of social science methods in legal research.108
Perhaps of most immediate interest to comparative constitutional law
scholars is Hirschl’s recent article, which provides an overview of
how social science research design principles can be applied in the
study of comparative constitutional law with the goal of improving
causal inferences.109 I will make no attempt to duplicate that effort.
Instead, I will illustrate one method of addressing causal
questions in comparative constitutional law. Substantively, my
example explores the following causal claim, mentioned briefly in
the review of comparative political economy scholarship above: that
107. For some of the leading texts used by students of comparative politics, see, for example,
HENRY E. BRADY & DAVID COLLIER, RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED
STANDARDS (2004), BARBARA GEDDES, PARADIGMS AND SAND CASTLES: THEORY BUILDING
AND RESEARCH DESIGN IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (2003), ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW
BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005), and
GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH (1994). Lee Epstein and Gary King have condensed the main insights from KING ET
AL., supra, and applied them to legal scholarship. See Epstein & King, supra note 104.
108. For an overview of empirical legal studies and an effort to rank law schools based on
empirical scholarship, see Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship:
The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006). A plenary session at the 2006 meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools was devoted to empirical legal research, and there have
been recent calls from a project based at University of Wisconsin’s law school for a “new legal
realism” to bridge law and social science. See Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a New Legal
Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335.
109. Hirschl, supra note 4, at 126.
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presidential systems result in lower total government spending than
parliamentary systems. Methodologically, I provide an example of
statistical or “large-N” analysis.110
Hirschl has convincingly
demonstrated the importance of basic principles of qualitative or
“small-N” research design for comparative constitutional law
scholarship.111 My focus on statistical methods is intended to
complement Hirschl’s emphasis by showing how a large-N approach
can be useful. As in all matters of research design, however, my
choice involves tradeoffs.112 On the one hand, large-N approaches
can facilitate understanding of broad patterns of cross-national
constitutional variation and economic consequences, allow
evaluation of the extent to which hypotheses about the consequences
of constitutions can be validly generalized across countries, and
provide a tool for reducing and estimating the extent of uncertainty
surrounding a causal inference. On the other hand, large-N
approaches provide relatively little detailed knowledge about specific
constitutional arrangements and their local contexts, and are less
readily able to trace the causal mechanisms that link constitutional
features with political, social, or economic outcomes. Small-N
methods are often better suited for these tasks.
A. Theory and Hypotheses
Persson and Tabellini predict that total central government
spending should be higher in parliamentary regimes than presidential
regimes.113 They base their prediction on a basic constitutional
feature of parliamentary systems that governs executive-legislative
relations: the dependence of the executive on legislative confidence.
In a parliamentary system, the legislature can dismiss the cabinet
110. Although empirical legal scholarship emphasizes and to a certain extent may be defining
itself in terms of statistical analysis, in comparative politics and comparative political economy,
qualitative or “small-N” approaches are also treated as valid empirical methods and are widely
used. Within political science, the most sophisticated methodological debates have less to do
with whether one method is superior to another than with the tradeoffs involved in choosing a
method and the circumstances, including the nature of one’s research problem, in which one
method may be more appropriate than another. See KING ET AL., supra note 107, at 5–6 (arguing
that although different in style, quantitative and qualitative methods are based on the same logic
of scientific inference, and that “neither quantitative nor qualitative research is superior to the
other”).
111. Hirschl, supra note 4, at 132.
112. See JOHN GERRING, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY: A CRITERIAL FRAMEWORK
(2001).
113. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 25.
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with a vote of no confidence. In the typical presidential system, the
constitutional rules governing executive-legislative relations are
different: the president is popularly elected for a fixed term and
generally cannot be removed by the legislature, except under
extraordinary circumstances such as impeachment.114
The theoretical logic connecting a confidence requirement with
higher government spending has two basic steps.115 First, a
confidence requirement gives the governing coalition in parliament
an incentive to act cohesively to retain its agenda-setting powers.116
As Persson, Roland, and Tabellini explain, in parliamentary systems,
“agenda-setting powers over legislation are typically associated with
ministerial portfolios, and the policy initiative thus belongs to the
government coalition as long as it has the confidence of a majority in
parliament. . . . The risk of losing valuable agenda-setting powers
after a government crisis then gives a governing coalition strong
incentives to form a stable legislative majority that does not shift
from issue to issue. . . .”117 In presidential systems on the other hand,
agenda powers “typically reside with powerful congressional
committees, and different committees hold power over different
policy dimensions. . . . As a result, legislative majorities often
change from issue to issue.”118 No legislative majority is needed to
keep an independently elected executive in office, giving members of
the president’s party no additional incentive to act cohesively.119
114. These are the characteristics of presidential regimes that Shugart and Carey refer to as
“separation of origin” and “separation of survival.” SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 20, at 22.
115. For a formal statement of the theory, see Torsten Persson et al., Comparative Politics
and Public Finance, 108 J. POL. ECON, 1121 (2000).
116. As summarized by Persson and Tabellini:
Parties supporting a parliamentary executive hold valuable powers that they risk losing
in a government crisis. Therefore, a confidence requirement creates strong incentives
to maintain party discipline. . . . [T]he incentives to hold legislative cum executive
majorities together extend from members of the same party to coalitions of parties. . . .
[Thus] the confidence requirement creates ‘legislative cohesion,’ namely, stable
majorities supporting the cabinet and voting together on policy proposals. The absence
of a confidence requirement, by contrast, fosters unstable coalitions and less discipline
within the majority.
PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 24.
117. Persson et al., supra note 115, at 1125.
118. Id. at 1124.
119. One difficulty with this step of Persson and Tabellini’s logic is that the government does
not necessarily have predominant agenda-setting power in regimes with a confidence
requirement. As Cheibub and Limongi note, “Government control over the legislative agenda
does not follow from the definition of parliamentarism.” Cheibub & Limongi, supra note 60, at
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Thus, the existence of a confidence requirement increases legislative
cohesion.
Second, the stable majority of incumbent legislators that results
from a confidence requirement, and “the majority of voters backing
them, become ‘residual claimants’ on additional revenue; they can
keep the benefits of spending within the majority, putting part of the
costs on the excluded minority.”120 The residual claimants, therefore,
favor higher spending. Absent a confidence requirement, there are
no such residual claimants on revenue, and the majority of voters and
legislators will oppose high spending. Thus, legislative cohesion
increases government spending.
Based on this reasoning, Persson and Tabellini predict that total
government spending will be higher when there is a confidence
requirement than when there is not.121 This prediction can be
expressed in the following hypothesis:
H1 (Legislative Cohesion Theory): Government spending is
higher in countries with constitutions that make the
executive’s survival in power dependent on legislative
confidence than in countries with constitutions that do not
impose a confidence requirement on the executive.
As just explained, Persson and Tabellini’s legislative cohesion
theory of government spending posits the following two causal steps:
a confidence requirement increases legislative cohesion, and
legislative cohesion increases government spending. I argue,
however, that the nature of a country’s legislative electoral system
can break the first step’s link between a confidence requirement and
legislative cohesion, thus breaking the chain of causation between a
confidence requirement and higher government spending. This is my
reasoning: as comparative politics scholars John Carey and Matthew
Shugart note, “it is widely accepted that in open list [electoral]
systems, personal reputation is more valuable to legislative
candidates than in closed-list systems.”122 In open-list systems,
voters have an intra-party preference vote; that is, they are able to
174. This critique of Persson and Tabellini’s theory implies an interaction effect between the
presence or absence of a confidence requirement and the extent of government agenda-setting
powers.
120. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 25.
121. Id.
122. SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 20, at 418.
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choose from among two or more candidates listed under a party’s
label, and thus to determine which of the party’s candidates are
elected.123 In open-list PR systems, for example, voters can rank
their party’s candidates on the ballot to determine the priority
according to which the party’s share of legislative seats is allocated
among the party’s candidates.124 In other words, these intra-party
preference votes determine which of a party’s candidates win seats.125
Thus, candidates from the same party compete against each other for
votes in open-list systems, giving them a strong incentive to cultivate
personal reputations among voters in order to distinguish themselves
from the party’s other candidates.126 This runs against the incentive
created by a confidence requirement for party members to act
cohesively.
Simply put, open-list electoral systems tend to
undermine legislative cohesion.127
By contrast, in closed-list systems voters do not enjoy an intraparty preference vote. In single-member district systems, parties
generally field only one candidate in a given district, leaving voters
with no intra-party choice.128 In closed-list PR systems, party leaders
rank their candidates on the ballot, and voters are not able to disturb
this ordering.129 With party leaders—rather than voters—having
control over the ballot ranking, candidates in closed-list systems have
a strong incentive to maintain party loyalty in order to appeal to party
leaders.130 Moreover, because voters choose among parties rather
than individual candidates, the value of personal reputations is
minimized, and the value of party reputations is increased.131 Thus,
123. Id. at 421; Daniel Kselman, Corruption and Intra-Party Choice: The Importance of
Preference-Voting for Electoral Accountability 3 (April 23, 2006) (unpublished paper prepared
for the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
124. In majoritarian systems, open-list systems include single-non-transferable vote and
single-transferable vote systems. See Kselman, supra note 123, at 3.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Cheibub and Limongi, supra note 60 (arguing that electoral systems that create
personal vote incentives may undermine party discipline).
128. Following Kselman, I conceptualize these systems as closed-list. See Kselman, supra
note 123, at 3.
129. See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 20, at 421.
130. See Cheibub & Limongi, supra note 60; Matthew Soberg Shugart, The Inverse
Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’
Constitutional Choices, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1 (1998).
131. See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 20, at 421.
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unlike open-list systems, closed-list electoral systems are consistent
with the incentive created by a confidence requirement for party
members to act cohesively.132 As comparative political economists
Mark Hallerberg and Patrik Marier note in their discussion of openlist and closed-list systems, “This seemingly small modification to
the system makes a big difference in terms of the level of
fragmentation within the [legislature].”133
Therefore, I propose a modification to Persson and Tabellini’s
legislative cohesion theory. Because open-list electoral systems
undermine legislative cohesion, breaking the chain of causation
between a confidence requirement and higher government spending,
a confidence requirement should only lead to higher government
spending in closed-list electoral systems. In other words, I argue that
there is an interaction effect between two institutional features: the
presence or absence of a confidence requirement in the constitution
and whether the electoral system is open-list or closed-list. The
relationship between a confidence requirement and government
spending depends on the nature of the electoral system and implies
the following conditional hypothesis:
H2 (Modified Legislative Cohesion Theory): Government
spending is higher in countries with constitutions that make
the executive’s survival in power dependent on legislative
confidence than in countries with constitutions that do not
impose a confidence requirement on the executive, but only
if there is a closed-list electoral system.
B. Data and Methods
The foregoing hypotheses both posit causal relationships
between a constitutional feature—the presence or absence of a
confidence requirement, which is the key explanatory variable—and
government spending, which is the dependent variable. I will begin
by replicating Persson and Tabellini’s test of the legislative cohesion
hypothesis. To do this, I will use ordinary least squares regression
analysis of their cross-sectional dataset of constitutional features,
government spending levels, and various social and economic
132. In fact, this logic even suggests that closed-list electoral systems may actually enhance
legislative cohesion.
133. Mark Hallerberg & Patrik Marier, Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget
Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 571, 576 (2004).
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control variables in 80 democratic countries between 1990 and
1998.134 Then I will test my modified legislative cohesion hypothesis
by incorporating into my statistical models the hypothesized
interaction effect between the presence or absence of a confidence
requirement and whether the electoral system is open-list or closedlist. This section describes the statistical models I will use to test
these hypotheses. Appendix A reports my data on government
spending, confidence requirements, electoral systems, and ideology.
Appendix B provides a complete description of my data and its
sources.
I wish to test hypotheses about the effect of cross-national
constitutional differences on government spending levels. Thus, the
dependent variable in my statistical models is Central Government
Spending which, following Persson and Tabellini, is equal to total
central government spending as a percentage of gross domestic
product (“GDP”) averaged over the period 1990–1998.135
To test the hypothesis implied by Persson and Tabellini’s
legislative cohesion theory that the presence of a confidence
requirement causes higher government spending (H1), I created the
dummy variable Confidence Requirement, which equals 1 if a
country’s constitution makes the executive dependent on legislative
confidence, and 0 if it does not. To test the hypothesis implied by
my modified legislative cohesion theory that this effect is conditional
upon the existence of a closed-list electoral system (H2), I created
the dummy variable Closed-List Electoral System, which equals 1 if
a country has a closed-list electoral system and 0 if it is open-list, and

134. The dataset appears in TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, DO CONSTITUTIONS
CAUSE LARGE GOVERNMENTS? QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE (2001), and is available at
IGIER,
Dataset,
http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/folder.php?vedi=822&tbn=albero&id_
folder=180 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007). Persson and Tabellini’s dataset contains 86 countries,
but data on central government spending is only available for 80 countries. Once I add the
variables discussed below for electoral systems and ideology, data limitations further reduce the
number of observations. Nevertheless, in all cases the overall statistical significance of the
models is high (p-values < .01).
135. An alternative might be to use general government spending, including spending by
subnational jurisdictions. See, e.g., Carles Boix, Democracy, Development, and the Public
Sector, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (2001) (using current receipts of the general government as his
dependent variable). I use Persson and Tabellini’s measure, both because their choice seems
appropriate given that their theory is about central government institutions and in order to ensure
that my results are comparable to theirs. In any event, both Persson & Tabellini and Boix report
that central and general government data are relatively well correlated in their datasets. BOIX,
supra note 93, at 179; PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 38.
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I multiply it by Confidence Requirement to model the hypothesized
interaction effect.136 The result, Confidence Requirement*ClosedList, is referred to as a multiplicative interaction term.137
I use three different groups of control variables to account for
other factors that may affect levels of government spending. First, in
all of my statistical models, I control for a number of economic and
demographic factors that are both used in Persson and Tabellini’s
statistical model and considered by the broader literature to be
significant determinants of government spending levels:138 (1) as Per
Capita Income increases, government spending is expected to
increase;139 (2) as Trade Openness increases, government spending is
expected to increase;140 (3) as the proportion of the Population under
15 increases, government spending is expected to increase;141 and (4)
as the proportion of the Population over Age 65 increases,
government spending is expected to increase.142 All models also
include the following additional control variables used by Persson
and Tabellini in order to replicate their findings and compare them to
my own: (5) the Age of Democracy; (6) the Quality of Democracy,
using the Freedom House143 democracy ratings; (7) whether the
country is Federal; (8) whether the country is a member of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

136. For example, if Confidence = 1, but Closed-List = 0, then Confidence*Closed-List = 0,
indicating that the confidence requirement in an open-list electoral system does not have an effect
on government spending; but if Closed-List = 1, then Confidence*Closed-List = 1, indicating that
the confidence requirement will increase government spending.
137. On multiplicative interaction terms in statistical models, see Thomas Brambor et al.,
Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 63 (2006),
and Bear F. Braumoeller, Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L
ORG. 807 (2004).
138. For a brief review of the political economy literature on the determinants of fiscal scale,
see Alt, supra note 75, at 161–62.
139. Wagner’s law posits that public spending increases with per capita income, a proposition
that is empirically supported. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 39; Alt, supra note 75, at
161; see also Rolf R. Strauch, Information and Public Spending: An Empirical Study of Budget
Processes in the US States, in INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS AND FISCAL POLICY 139, 151 (Rolf R.
Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen eds., 2000) (“The best known predictor of government spending is
per-capita income.”).
140. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 39; see BOIX, supra note 93, at 182.
141. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 39; Strauch, supra note 139, at 151.
142. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 39; Strauch, supra note 139, at 151 (noting that
both the youngest and oldest groups are “service-dependent social groups” with low tax capacity).
143. Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (a non-profit,
nonpartisan organization studying democracy throughout the world).
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(“OECD”);144 and (9) whether the electoral system is Majoritarian.145
Together, these factors constitute my basic set of control variables.
Second, I include a potentially important control variable that
Persson and Tabellini omit: ideology. As Alt explains, “the intuition
linking the ideological complexion of the government to fiscal scale
or the size of government is clear. Left governments are more likely
than Right governments to want or to target a high level of
spending.”146 Empirical findings support this intuition.147 Indeed,
Carles Boix argues that it is partisanship above all that determines
economic strategy.148 If the executive and legislative branches are
both centrist or have different ideological leanings, the implications
of ideology for government spending may not be clear. However,
when both the executive and legislative branches are on the left of
the political spectrum, one might expect higher government
spending, whether or not there is a confidence requirement.
Conversely, when both branches are dominated by right parties, one
might expect lower government spending—again, with or without a
confidence requirement.149 To control for ideology, I created the
144. OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (organization funded by thirty
different countries to achieve sustainable economic growth among member countries).
145. Although Persson and Tabellini are not explicit about this, one might expect the
effectiveness of constitutional arrangements to be greater in more mature and well functioning
democracies. One would expect central government spending to be lower in federal systems, to
the extent that the results are that a greater proportion of total spending is local spending.
However, Persson & Tabellini’s data for this measure is not ideal, because it measures political
rather than fiscal federalism. More economically developed countries are expected to spend
more, and OECD membership is used by Persson and Tabellini as a proxy for development.
Finally, Persson and Tabellini expect countries with majoritarian electoral systems to spend less
than those with PR systems. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 22, 37–50.
146. Alt, supra note 75, at 163.
147. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA ET AL., POLITICAL CYCLES AND THE MACROECONOMY
(1997); CARLES BOIX, POLITICAL PARTIES, GROWTH AND EQUALITY: CONSERVATIVE AND
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ECONOMIC STRATEGIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1998); EVELYNE
HUBER & JOHN D. STEPHENS, DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE: PARTIES
AND POLICIES IN GLOBAL MARKETS (2001).
148. BOIX, supra note 93, at 144.
149. Excluding a variable from a statistical model does not create bias unless it both affects
the dependent variable and is correlated with a key explanatory variable. KING ET AL., supra note
107, at 169 (“[W]e can safely omit control variables, even if they have a strong influence on the
dependent variable, as long as they do not vary with the included explanatory variable.”). Thus,
excluding ideology will bias my findings about the consequences of constitutional variation only
if ideology is a cause of government spending levels, as well as correlated with the presence of a
confidence requirement and closed-list electoral systems. Such a correlation may appear
doubtful, given that constitutional arrangements are generally stable relative to the ideological
composition of governments. Nevertheless, I control for ideology both to check the robustness of
my findings and to test the hypothesis that left-leaning ideology increases government spending.
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variable, Ideology, using data on the political party affiliation of the
executive and legislative branches, and coded it as follows: “-1” if
both the executive branch and legislative branch are right-leaning
ideologically, with the negative sign implying lower government
spending; “+1” if both the executive branch and legislative branch
are left-leaning, with the positive sign implying higher government
spending; and “0” otherwise, indicating no clear expectations about
the effect on spending.
Finally, in some of their models, Persson and Tabellini also
include six variables controlling for the colonial origins and
geographic location of a country.150 My full set of controls includes
these variables, along with my basic controls and Ideology.
C. Results and Discussion
The results are presented in Table 2.151 Model 1 replicates
Persson and Tabellini’s findings and tests the hypothesis based on
the legislative cohesion theory (H1). The coefficient for Confidence
Requirement indicates that, all else being equal, the existence of a
confidence requirement increases central government spending by an
estimated 6.1 percent of GDP. There is 95 percent certainty that the
actual effect is between 1.7 and 10.5 percent.152 As Models 2 and 3
indicate, the existence of a confidence requirement continues to have
an upward effect on government spending even with the additional
control variables included. Overall, these results support the
hypothesis that government spending is higher in countries with
150. The controls include dummy variables for colonial origin (British, Spanish, and others)
and geographical location (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). Persson and Tabellini include these
additional variables on the grounds that they may influence policy performance measures (such as
corruption) and also may have influenced the initial choice of constitutional arrangements, thus
raising concerns about endogeneity. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at 114–15, 158–60.
151. Additional analysis accounted for the possibility of endogeneity by using two-stage least
squares regression (findings regarding my key explanatory variables are the same). However,
even this technique cannot eliminate the possibility of endogeneity. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu,
Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The
Economic Effects of Constitutions, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 1025, 1047 (2005) (acknowledging the
“robust correlations” documented by Persson and Tabellini, but questioning whether their
statistical methods reveal actual causal effects of constitutional features). Due to limited data on
electoral systems and ideology, the number of observations in models 2 through 6 drop
considerably. However, the overall models remain highly statistically significant (p-values < .01
in all cases).
152. The significance level for Confidence Requirement is p< .01 in Model 1, meaning that
there is less than a 1 percent probability that the null hypothesis (that there is no relationship
between Confidence and Central Government Spending) is correct.
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING (% OF GDP)
Explanatory
Variable

(1)
Legislative
Cohesion
Theory

(2)
LCT with
Ideology

(3)
LCT with
Full
Controls

(4)
Modified
Legislative
Cohesion
Theory
-1.322
(3.594)

(5)
Modified
LCT with
Ideology

(6)
Modified
LCT with
Full
Controls

Confidence
Requirement
Closed-List
Electoral
System
Confidence
Requirement*
Closed-List

6.077
(2.207)***

8.772
(2.567)***

6.821
(2.957)**

-0.629
(3.915)

-2.402
(4.247)

—

—

—

-8.330
(3.212)**

-10.707
(3.470)***

-11.336
(4.452)**

—

—

—

12.205
(3.756)***

12.514
(3.965)***

14.311
(4.742)***

—

3.605
(2.042)*

2.653
(2.197)

—

3.122
(2.051)

2.650
(2.158)

-1.896
(1.901)

-0.231
(2.508)

1.291
(2.589)

-1.309
(2.079)

-0.631
(2.590)

-0.005
(2.787)

0.040
(0.019)**

0.042
(0.028)

0.024
(0.029)

0.044
(0.028)

0.032
(0.030)

0.039
(0.031)

0.443
(0.266)

0.840
(0.326)**

0.922
(0.369)**

0.379
(0.260)

0.785
(0.325)**

0.836
(0.375)**

1.791
(0.554)***

2.604
(0.645)***

2.491
(0.703)***

1.527
(0.537)***

2.319
(0.622)***

2.266
(0.670)***

-0.275
(5.281)

2.124
(5.070)

-0.317
(5.094)

-1.711
(4.901)

2.000
(4.754)

-0.250
(4.875)

Quality of
Democracy

-1.893
(1.068)*

-0.848
(1.556)

-1.970
(1.670)

-2.330
(1.432)

-1.989
(1.542)

-2.647
(1.715)

Federal
System

-2.990
(2.362)

-3.701
(2.625)

-4.274
(2.659)

-2.935
(2.305)

-3.810
(2.489)

-3.583
(2.528)

OECD
Member
Majoritarian
Electoral
System

0.564
(3.615)

-3.644
(3.856)

-5.403
(4.262)

-0.326
(3.465)

-3.033
(3.675)

-5.308
(4.186)

-3.292
(1.903)*

-3.791
(2.055)*

-4.699
(2.539) *

-4.622
(2.079)**

-4.942
(2.155)**

-3.232
(2.632)

16.150
(24.527)

-19.079
(32.699)

-25.785
(34.537)

22.469
(26.026)

-0.029
(32.318)

-1.795
(35.525)

Colonial
Origin and
Geographical
Controls

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Observations

80

58

58

70

56

56

0.63

0.73

0.78

0.72

0.78

0.82

Ideology
Per Capita
Income
Trade
Openness
Proportion of
Population
below 15
Proportion of
Population
over 65
Age of
Democracy

Constant

R-squared

Notes: Dependent variable in all models is Central Government Spending (% of
GDP). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p < .01, **p <
.05, *p < .10 (two-tailed tests). For all models, p-value of F statistic < .0001.
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constitutions that make the executive’s survival in power dependent
on legislative confidence, versus countries with constitutions that do
not impose such a confidence requirement.
However, the actual relationship between Confidence
Requirement and Central Government Spending appears to be more
complex: consistent with the hypothesis based on my modified
legislative cohesion theory (H2), the effect of a confidence
requirement on spending depends on whether the electoral system is
open-list or closed-list. In Model 4, the existence of a confidence
requirement does not appear to affect government spending when
there is an open-list electoral system.153 Moreover, consistent with
my hypothesis, the coefficient for Confidence Requirement*ClosedList indicates that the joint effect of a confidence requirement and
closed-list electoral system is to increase government spending by an
estimated 12.2 percent of GDP. There is 95 percent certainty that the
actual effect is between 4.7 and 19.7 percent. As Models 5 and 6
indicate, this effect continues even after including the additional
controls.
Table 3 summarizes my findings. The hypothesis based on the
legislative cohesion theory predicts that a confidence requirement
will increase central government spending, without distinguishing
between open-list and closed-list electoral systems (H1). In contrast,
the hypothesis based on my modified legislative cohesion theory
predicts that this will only be the case in closed-list electoral systems
(H2). Table 3 shows that mean levels of government spending are
higher when there is a confidence requirement with both types of
electoral systems, but the difference is greater with closed-list (15
percent) than open-list (5 percent). Moreover, when there is an
open-list system, there is 95 percent certainty only that the effect on
central government spending of a hypothetical constitutional change
153. The 95-percent confidence interval for the coefficient of Confidence Requirement is [8.5, +5.9]. Because Model 4 is an interaction model, the coefficient of Confidence Requirement
now only captures the effect it has on Central Government Spending when Closed-List Electoral
System = 0 (i.e., when the electoral system is open-list). Brambor et al., supra note 137, at 72.
Interestingly, the coefficient for Closed-List Electoral System indicates that the existence of a
closed-list electoral system reduces government spending by an estimated 8 percent of GDP when
there is not a confidence requirement (i.e., when the political system is presidential). It is
important to note that one reason for the lack of a statistically significant finding for Confidence
Requirement in open-list systems might be lack of variation when Closed-List Electoral
System = 0 (there are only five countries in my dataset—Brazil, Cyprus, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Switzerland—that combine Confidence Requirement = 0 and Closed-List = 0).
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Open-List

Closed-List

No

Mean of Central Government
Spending: 28% of GDP

Mean of Central Government
Spending: 20% of GDP

Yes

Mean of Central Government
Spending: 33% of GDP

Mean of Central Government
Spending: 35% of GDP

CONFIDENCE
REQUIREMENT?

H1 (Legislative Cohesion
Theory): Hypothesized Effect of
Change from No to Yes

Increase in Central Government Spending

H2 (Modified Legislative
Cohesion Theory): Hypothesized
Effect of Change from No to Yes

No Effect

Increase in Central
Government Spending

Estimated Effect of Change from
No to Yes (% of GDP)

-1.3%

10.9%

95% Confidence Interval

-8.5 to 5.9

6.0 to 15.7

from no confidence requirement to a confidence requirement is
between -8.5 percent and +5.9 percent of GDP—in other words, we
do not even know with 95 percent certainty whether the effect is
positive or negative.
In contrast, when there is a closed-list system, a hypothetical
constitutional change from no confidence requirement to a
confidence requirement increases government spending by an
estimated 10.9 percent, with 95 percent certainty that the actual
effect is between 6.0 and 15.7 percent. Overall, these results support
the hypothesis based on the modified legislative cohesion theory that
government spending is higher in countries with constitutions that
make the executive’s survival in power dependent on legislative
confidence than in countries with constitutions that do not impose a
confidence requirement on the executive, if there is a closed-list
electoral system.
Regarding control variables, demographic factors have a
significant impact on government spending. The proportion of the
population over 65 has an upward effect on government spending in
all models, with estimates ranging from +1.8 percent to +2.6 percent
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of GDP. The proportion of the population under 15 is below
traditional levels of statistical significance in some models, but has
the expected positive sign in all models. Overall, these findings
suggest that government spending is to a significant extent a
response to demographic realities, particularly to increases in the size
of the population of retirees. Majoritarian electoral systems have a
downward influence on government spending, with estimates
ranging from -3.3 percent to -4.9 percent, depending on the model,
although the effect is not statistically significant at traditional levels
in Model 6.
Other control variables generally do not have their anticipated
effects on government spending. Ideology has the expected positive
sign, which would indicate that left-leaning governments spend more
than right-leaning governments, but this effect is not statistically
significant except in Model 2.154 The implication is that the
interaction between constitutional rules governing executivelegislative relations and personal vote incentives created by electoral
systems, combined with demographics, may be a more important
influence on government spending than ideology. Perhaps this result
should not be too surprising. Regardless of ideology, politicians
seeking reelection may seek political support by spending on
education for youth and benefits for retirees. And even if politicians
on the right have an ideological preference for cutting social
spending, doing so can be politically costly.
*****
There are four important lessons to be learned from this
analysis. First, constitutional differences matter. I have illustrated
one way in which they matter economically: central government
spending appears to be higher when the constitution makes the
government dependent on the confidence of the legislature. In other
words, the evidence suggests that parliamentary systems spend more
than presidential systems.
Second, whether constitutional
differences matter, and how they matter, depend on the broader legal
and institutional context. In this case, whether a confidence
154. Recent research has indicated, however, that there may be significant limits on crossnational comparability of measures of ideology based on political party affiliation, which implies
that my negative findings regarding ideology could be a result of data limitations. Michael D.
McDonald et al., Cross-Temporal and Cross-National Comparisons of Party Left-Right
Positions, 26 ELECTORAL STUD. 62 (2007).
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requirement leads to increased government spending depends on the
nature of the electoral system. Third, perhaps obviously, but
nevertheless empirically confirming intuitions and theoretical priors,
other factors matter too. For example, not only constitutions and
electoral systems, but also demographics, have an influence on
government spending.
Finally, there is a lesson that returns us to this article’s
methodological theme. Large-N statistical analysis provides a
powerful tool for taking causality seriously in comparative
constitutional law: for evaluating causal claims about constitutions,
and for exploring the extent to which such claims have cross-national
validity. In this article, such analysis revealed the limited ability to
generalize the claim that the presence of a confidence requirement
increases government spending. However, it provided evidence in
support of the broad cross-national generalizability of the proposition
that there is such an effect when there is a closed-list electoral
system, even after controlling for a wide range of other factors that
influence government spending. On the other hand, neither this nor
any regression analysis can prove causality. Rather, regression
analysis is a technique for estimating causal effects and the
uncertainty that surrounds them.155 Moreover, this type of analysis
provides little detailed knowledge about constitutions and
government spending in particular countries. Nor does this analysis
allow us to empirically trace the specific causal mechanisms posited
by the legislative cohesion theory and the modified legislative
cohesion theory. Small-N analysis, following principles of causal
inference such as those illustrated by Hirschl,156 may be better suited
for such tasks. The point is that research requires methodological
choices, and these choices involve tradeoffs. The goal is to find the
method that is most appropriate for the research question at hand.

155

Moreover, the appropriate statistical techniques for estimating causal effects are
often contested by empirical scholars, providing another reason to refrain from
treating statistical findings as conclusive. See, e.g., Acemoglu, supra note _, and
Lorenz Blume et al., The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating—and
Extending—Persson and Tabellini (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=985682) (each questioning findings of Persson
and Tabellini on various methodological grounds that also would apply to some of
my findings in Part IV.C).
156. See Hirschl, supra note 4.
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For comparative constitutional law scholars, grappling with these
tradeoffs is an important part of taking causality seriously.
V. CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR
EMPIRICAL COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Taking causality seriously in comparative constitutional law
implies an empirical agenda that has theoretical, methodological, and
pedagogical dimensions. Theoretically, the focus would be on
research questions about constitutional differences that are framed in
explicitly causal terms, and on the development of positive theories
from which hypothetical answers could be derived. Although the
illustrations I have given in this article are primarily from
comparative politics and comparative political economy, law and
economics scholars, including those in comparative law, are already
engaged in this type of work.157 Cooter’s The Strategic Constitution
is an example of how this type of theorizing can be applied to
constitutions.158 Although I have attempted to show that economists
and political scientists have made important theoretical contributions,
legal scholars arguably have a comparative advantage given their
familiarity with constitutional processes, and thus have a leading role
to play in interdisciplinary comparative constitutional law theorizing.
What types of causal questions might be on the theoretical
agenda of empirical comparative constitutional law? As I have
argued, the questions can take at least two basic forms: one treating
constitutions as dependent variables to be explained, and the other
treating constitutions as explanatory variables that can help explain
other phenomena. But even this general formulation may be
unnecessarily constraining. For example, from a constructivist
perspective, there are important questions to be asked about the
constitutive effects of constitutions, questions which themselves have
causal properties,159 and questions which legal scholars are already
157. See, e.g., MATTEI, supra note 6 (taking a law and economics approach to comparative
private law).
158. See COOTER, supra note 5.
159. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink explain in their review of constructivism in
international relations and comparative politics scholarship,
For constructivists, understanding how things are put together and how they occur is
not mere description. Understanding the constitution of things is essential in
explaining how they behave and what causes political outcomes. . . . Constitution in
this sense [i.e., the constructivist, not the legal, sense] is causal, since how things are
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asking in other contexts.160 As my review of the comparative politics
and comparative political economy literature indicates, much of the
existing empirical work on constitutions focuses on basic features of
government, such as electoral systems, federalism, and executivelegislative relations. But so far the subject of comparative
constitutional rights, even though it has received considerable
doctrinal and normative attention from legal scholars, has been
relatively neglected in empirical scholarship, suggesting that this
may be a particularly important avenue for future empirical
comparative constitutional law research.161 The main point, however,
is not about which new questions should be asked. As I have
attempted to demonstrate, comparative constitutional law scholarship
already raises a host of interesting and important causal questions,
questions that deserve to be taken seriously.
Methodologically, the goal would be to select appropriate
techniques for evaluating hypotheses about the causes and
consequences of cross-national constitutional variation, while
maintaining awareness of the tradeoffs that are inherent in
methodological choices.162 In this paper, I have illustrated how one
type of statistical or “large-N” analysis can be applied to test

put together makes possible, or even probable, certain kinds of political behavior and
effects. . . . [T]he fact that constitutive explanations have causal properties means that
the distinction between constitutive explanations and other forms of explanation may
not be sharp in practice, particularly in empirical work.
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 391, 394 (2001).
160. For example, Cass R. Sunstein argues that legal rules can change social norms. CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 32–69 (1997). According to Sunstein, “Social
practices, including law, will inevitably affect preferences. There is no way for a legal system to
remain neutral with respect to preference formation.” Id. at 5. Likewise, Lawrence Lessig seeks
to explain “how law helps construct social reality” and thus is “one dimension in the practice of
changing incentives to change behavior.” Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 948, 1021 (1995). Elsewhere I have sketched how constructivist theory
might be applied to public law. See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking beyond the DomesticInternational Divide: Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155 (2004);
Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking beyond the Domestic-International Divide: Constructivism
and the Unified Concept of Public Law (Apr. 16, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
161. In related work, I have been developing an empirical comparative constitutional law
project on the origins and consequences of social and economic rights.
162. As Cooter argues, positive theory, by “[r]eplacing intuition with logic often reveals
causal connections that no one previously articulated. Logic, however, guarantees consistency,
not predictive accuracy. Predictive accuracy comes from empirical validity” which in turn comes
from empirically testing hypotheses. COOTER, supra note 5, at 374.
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hypotheses in comparative constitutional law, and Hirschl has
demonstrated the importance of qualitative “small-N” research
techniques for comparative constitutional law scholarship.163 Again,
although my examples were drawn primarily from economics and
political science, this does not mean that legal scholars do not have a
leading role to play in the field of methods. To the contrary, with the
recently renewed emphasis on empirical legal studies,164 legal
scholars are increasingly applying methods aimed at improving
causal inferences. So far, there has been relatively little legal
scholarship that brings together comparative law and empirical legal
studies, but doing so is one way that legal scholars might explore
methods for taking causality seriously in comparative constitutional
law.
The methodological element of the empirical comparative
constitutional law agenda has important implications for functionally
oriented theories of constitutional interpretation. For example, in his
book, Active Liberty, Justice Stephen Breyer argues that judges
should strive to understand the purposes of the constitutional phrases
being interpreted, and then “consider the likely consequences of the
interpretative alternatives, valued in terms of the phrase’s
purposes.”165 In other words, Breyer calls on judges to make causal
inferences. Yet in practice, one might suspect that when judges
make inferences about likely consequences, they often do not do so
in a very systematic manner and generally do not attempt to estimate
the levels of uncertainty associated with their inferences.166 The
argument I made in this article suggests that empirical comparative
constitutional law scholarship could play a supporting role in
functional approaches to constitutional interpretation—one aimed not
163. Hirschl, supra note 4.
164. George, supra note 108.
165. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
8 (2005). As Breyer clarifies, “to emphasize consequences is to emphasize consequences related
to the particular textual provision at issue. The judge must examine the consequences through the
lens of the relevant constitutional value or purpose.” Id. at 120.
166. See Hirschl, supra note 4, at 128–29 (noting judicial references to foreign law are too
often “eclectic, at times even scant and superficial” using “[c]ase selection [that] is seldom
systematic,” and “rarely pay[ing] due attention to the context and nuances that have given rise to
similar or alternative interpretation or practice of constitutional norms. In short, from a
methodological standpoint, we have yet to encounter a coherent theory of inter-court
constitutional borrowing”); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004) (critiquing U.S. Supreme
Court references to foreign law for its lack of a consistent underlying methodology).
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at clarifying purposes, but at improving the causal inferences that are
inherent in this type of judicial decision-making.167
Pedagogically, the challenge is to figure out how, and how
much, to incorporate considerations about the origins and
consequences of constitutional arrangements into comparative law
and constitutional law teaching. Mark Tushnet has argued:
The best use of non-U.S. materials in a basic Constitutional
Law course would . . . identify practices or doctrines in
other stable democracies that are different from those in the
United States, and ask: “They do things differently there.
What reasons might they have for adopting their practices
or doctrines? What reasons might there be that caution
against our adopting those practices or doctrines?”168
The relevant reasons generally will include the expected
consequences of different practices or doctrines, and the ways that
different constitutional arrangements may interact with countryspecific cultural, political or social differences to produce
unanticipated consequences. By providing evidence about the realworld consequences of constitutions, empirical comparative
constitutional law scholarship can help students think more
concretely about these questions.
More generally, empirical
comparative constitutional law in its pedagogical form would invite
students to think critically not only about the constitutional text, its
history, and its judicial interpretations, but also about its role in
broader social, political, and economic processes. Both positive
theoretical work on how constitutions work and why they matter, and
empirical findings about the political and economic consequences of
constitutions, might help students grapple with these important
questions.169
167. Whether or not functional approaches to constitutional interpretation are desirable in the
first place is a question that empirical comparative constitutional law scholarship alone cannot
answer. And even if they are desirable, to play the supporting role I describe would be a very
ambitious goal for empirical scholarship, and one that raises a wide range of challenges, including
issues similar to those that surround the use of social science in general by litigants and judges.
Even if imperfect, however, the argument can be made that “[l]awmakers would do better to use
imperfect empirical analysis than perfect nonempirical analysis.” COOTER, supra note 5, at 5.
168. Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic
Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 674 (2005).
169. Two clarifications are in order here. First, consistent with Tushnet’s “obvious point that
the more of one thing one does in a class, the less one can do of something else,” careful thought
needs to be given to the tradeoffs involved in introducing empirical comparative material to
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My overall argument implies that empirical comparative
constitutional law should be an interdisciplinary endeavor. As I
attempted to demonstrate in Parts II and III of this article, not only
legal scholars, but also scholars of comparative politics and
comparative political economy, have strong motivations to gain a
better understanding of the origins and consequences of crossnational constitutional differences. At this stage, a reasonable
assessment would be that the former have a comparative advantage
in their appreciation of the nature of constitutional variation and of
constitutional processes, whereas the latter have a comparative
advantage in their familiarity with the political and economic
contexts within which constitutions operate and with the social
science methods that have been developed to address the challenges
of causal inference. As Cooter laments, relatively few social
scientists study constitutional law, and few constitutional scholars
have the necessary training in empirical methods.170 But ideally the
interdisciplinary pursuit of an empirical comparative constitutional
law agenda will allow legal scholars to improve their understanding
of contextual factors and methods of causal inference, and allow
political scientists and political economists to improve their
understanding of constitutions. After all, taking causality seriously
in comparative constitutional law involves not only taking causality
seriously, but also taking comparative constitutional law seriously.

replace more traditional material. Id. at 672. It may well be that the pedagogical function of
empirical comparative constitutional law is best performed primarily in upper-level elective
courses on comparative constitutional law or perhaps in interdisciplinary courses that could be
developed to focus specifically on the role of constitutions in economic, political and social
context. Second, it should go without saying that empirical comparative constitutional law
findings should not be presented to students as “facts” like the facts of a case. To the contrary, it
is far more consistent with a social scientific spirit of causal inference to encourage a serious, yet
skeptical, appreciation of empirical findings and to emphasize the importance of estimating the
uncertainty associated with causal claims. Eventually, there may at some law schools be a critical
mass of interested students and faculty that would make it appropriate to offer training in causal
inference or empirical research more generally, including essential principles of comparative
analysis. Even without specialized courses, some of these matters could—and at some law
schools already are—addressed in law and social science courses.
170. COOTER, supra note 5, at 5, 374. As Part III suggests, the number of social scientists
studying constitutions appears to be increasing—at least in comparative politics and comparative
political economy. Recently renewed interest in empirical legal studies in the legal academy
suggests that a growing number of legal scholars will have training in empirical methods, albeit
not necessarily in comparative methods.
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APPENDIX A: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING,
CONFIDENCE REQUIREMENTS, CLOSED-LIST ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS, AND IDEOLOGY IN 71 DEMOCRACIES (1990–1998)
Central
Government
Spending
(%GDP)

Confidence
Requirement
(0=no, 1=yes)

Closed List
Electoral
System (0=no,
1=yes)

Ideology
(-1=right,
0=center,
1=left)

No Confidence Requirement, Open-List
Brazil
Cyprus (G)
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Switzerland

30.66129
33.96568
23.11274
27.38108
26.49568

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
.33
—

Confidence Requirement, Open-List
Australia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Greece
Hungary
India
Ireland
Latvia
Luxembourg
Malta
Mauritius
Nepal
Slovak Republic
Thailand

25.78327
36.34661
40.14317
29.99682
38.32095
45.25062
35.26539
49.95391
15.78957
38.09354
31.39015
40.17635
40.98212
22.50179
16.97054
40.38233
16.22416

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
.11
0
—
0
0
.33
.11
0
0
—
0
-.78
0
—
—
0

No Confidence Requirement, Closed List
Argentina
Belarus
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador

14.00048
35.52256
20.98121
21.02538
14.06831
23.34365
14.82071
16.32197
13.63237

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-.89
—
0
0
0
-.11
0
0
-.11
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Central
Government
Spending
(%GDP)

Confidence
Requirement
(0=no, 1=yes)

Closed List
Electoral
System (0=no,
1=yes)

Ideology
(-1=right,
0=center,
1=left)

No Confidence Requirement, Closed List (continued)
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Namibia
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Russia
South Korea
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

9.74306
21.47791
15.48577
37.27320
31.00764
11.97500
17.27761
18.89076
26.26176
17.06728
21.87741
29.38198
19.34534

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

—
-1
1
1
—
-1
-.56
—
—
-.78
.22
0
—

Confidence Requirement, Closed List
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Botswana
Bulgaria
Canada
Germany
Iceland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Papua N. Guinea
Poland
Portugal
Romania
South Africa
Spain
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Sweden
Trinidad & Tobago
Turkey
United Kingdom

40.14563
18.80976
32.36219
47.93909
30.06591
38.57272
42.44020
24.85338
32.67864
31.80872
46.31829
48.80320
20.50902
51.17833
35.98045
39.88120
30.81113
39.48863
41.66164
33.38912
31.33985
36.19315
34.78068
44.75311
28.06996
24.06719
40.37266

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
-.56
-.33
0
-1
-1
—
0
0
0
0
-.11
0
0
-.44
0
0
—
0
.
-.33
0
—
0
.22
-.33
-1
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APPENDIX B: DATA AND SOURCES171
1. Dependent Variable
Government Spending: Central government spending as a
percentage of gross domestic product. Source: Persson
and Tabellini, who obtained their data from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics.
2. Key Explanatory Variables
Confidence Requirement: Dummy variable equal to 1 if
there is a confidence requirement, 0 otherwise. Source: I
constructed this variable by using Persson and Tabellini’s
variable PRES, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 in
presidential regimes (only those in which the confidence
of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay
in power), 0 otherwise. Thus, Confidence Requirement =
1-PRES. Persson and Tabellini coded their PRES
variable based on Shugart and Carey (1992) and national
sources.
Closed-List: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the legislative
electoral system is closed-list, 0 if open-list. Sources:
World Bank Database of Political Institutions CL
variable, which equals 1 if closed lists are used and 0 if
they are not, and Daniel Kselman’s OPEN variable,
which equals 1 if there is a preference vote (open-list), 0
if there is not (closed-list).172
3. Control Variables
Ideology: Dominant ideology in the government, equal to
-1 if the government is right-leaning, 0 if it is centrist, and
+1 if it is left-leaning. Source: World Bank Database of
Political Institutions EXECRLC and ALLHOUSE
variables.173 EXECRLC indicates whether the chief
executive’s ideology, based on his or her political party,
171. All references to Persson and Tabellini are to PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 91, at
279–86.
172. See Kselman, supra note 123; see also Thorsten Beck et al., New Tools in Comparative
Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions, 15 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 165
(2001).
173. See Beck et al., supra note 172.
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is left, centrist, or right. ALLHOUSE indicates whether
the party of the chief executive has an absolute majority
in all houses of the legislature that have lawmaking
powers. Using this data, I coded my Ideology variable as
-1 if the chief executive has right ideology and controls
the relevant houses of the legislature; +1 if the chief
executive has left ideology and controls the relevant
houses of the legislature; and 0 otherwise; and I averaged
the result for the nine years between 1989 and 1997 (with
the one year lag on the grounds that ideological changes
do not immediately change policy). The logic behind
coding other situations as 0 is that (a) centrist ideology
does not clearly imply an upward or downward effect on
spending and (b) when the executive controls neither
house or only one, he or she cannot push through
legislation to cut or increase spending, so there is no clear
effect on spending. Data is missing for some years; I
coded Ideology as missing data if there was not at least
seven years of data, except if ALLHOUSE = 0 for at least
seven of nine years then I coded Ideology as 0, since in
that case the left-right position of the executive would not
have a clear policy impact anyway.
Per Capita Income: Natural logarithm of real GDP per
capita in constant dollars expressed in international
prices, base year 1985. Source: Persson and Tabellini’s
LYP variable, which uses Penn World tables and the
World Bank World Development Indicators data.
Trade Openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods
and services measured as a share of GDP. Source:
Persson and Tabellini’s TRADE variable, which uses
World Bank World Development Indicators data.
Population Under 15: Percentage of the population under
age 15 in the total population. Source: Persson and
Tabellini’s PROP1564 variable, based on World Bank
World Development Indicators Data, which equals the
percentage of the population between 15 and 64 years of
age. Population under 15 = 100-PROP1564-PROP65.
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Population over Age 65: Percentage of the population
over age 65 in the total population. Source: Persson and
Tabellini’s PROP65 variable, based on World Bank
World Development Indicators data.
Age of Democracy: This is Persson and Tabellini’s AGE
variable, defined as (2000-DEM_AGE)/200 and varying
between 0 and 1, where (a) DEM_AGE is the first year of
democratic rule in a country, corresponding to the first
year of a string of positive yearly values for the variable
POLITY for that country that continues uninterrupted
until the end of the sample, given that the country was
also an independent nation during the entire time period;
does not count foreign occupation during World War II as
an interruption of democracy; and (b) POLITY is the
score for democracy, computed by subtracting the
AUTOC score from the DEMOC score and ranging from
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
Quality of Democracy: This is Persson and Tabellini’s
GASTIL variable, equal to the average of indexes for civil
liberties and political rights, where each index is
measured on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing the highest
degree of freedom and 7 the lowest, using the Freedom
House “Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings.”
Federal: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a
federal political structure, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson
and Tabellini’s FEDERAL variable.
OECD: Dummy variable equal to 1 for all countries that
were members of the OECD before 1993, 0 otherwise.
Source: Persson and Tabellini’s OECD variable.
Majoritarian: Dummy variable for electoral systems,
equal to 1 if all the lower house seats in a country are
elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson
and Tabellini’s MAJ variable.

